_forestfortrees
_forestfortrees on Hacker News
I can see this leading to RCE in a number of scenarios:
- default/abandoned mysql install with default root creds. If you also have a file write primitive on the server (which IS common in LAMP stacks), now you can get RCE with it.
- mysql install with weak superuser creds that you've bruteforced. If you also have a file write primitive on the server (which IS common in LAMP stacks), now you can get RCE with it.
- db superuser uses the same db password as the app's connection. If you also have a file write primitive on the server (which IS common in LAMP stacks), now you can get RCE with it.
Are these super-common scenarios? No, but they are most certainly out there. Yes, you can say "this obvious mitigation would have prevented it", but that doesn't change the facts. You can abuse this in some set of circumstances to get RCE, so "RCE" is an accurate label, and THAT'S ALL I'M SAYING.
When... did I say that? I said: a file write primitive on a server is fairly common. e.g. a PHP web app that lets you upload a file to some directory on the server. An attacker could use such a feature to upload a .so file to load into mysqld.
I'm just arguing that the title of RCE is accurate here. In a non-trivial amount of configurations you can abuse this vulnerability to remotely compromise a machine you otherwise couldn't get a shell on. Hence RCE.
Given MySQL creds and a (fairly common) file write primitive (file upload functionality, log injection, etc) that in itself should not qualify as a vulnerability, you can execute remote code on the server with just this vulnerability.
I think RCE is a fair description here.