Since you can never raise enough taxes to pay for everyone's needs, there's no consistent way to implement the modern notion of rights, so it simply becomes a list of irrational demands.
The only consistent system of rights (of rights which can be granted to everyone equally), take the right to life as a fundamental, and derive other rights from that. The derivative rights in such a system are the Enlightenment-era rights, I.e, life, liberty, property and the pursuit of happiness.
I'm not even entirely concerned with rights being apparently, at least at first blush, inconsistent.
What I am concerned with is what you've just done: to elevate a single right or a single set of rights to some priveleged status, simply on a say-so. These turn out to be both exceptionally arbitrary, on close examination, and frequently dysfunctional. Take a trolly problem, or a unit in battle, or a sinking ocean liner, or any number of other conditions, with your primacy of right-to-life, for example.
Note that life, liberty, and happiness are given in the US Declaration of Independence (though not the Constitution) as unalienable rights. That is, not rights which must be granted (any two-bit punk can claim your life, a zip-tie can restrict your liberty, and a wailing child can remove your happiness), but they cannot be given to another -- unlike your property, or business income, or even spouse and children.
So no, actually, I don't find that a convincing argument, though thanks.
This isn't because I don't like the specific rights conveyed. Generally, most liberal rights strike me as personally quite desirable. And preferable on a social basis.
It's the latter which I think makes a better basis for arguing for (or against) rights. There are rules of behavior, including rules reserved to individuals, which seem to make for more viable societies, cultures, and civilisations. There are also, though, overabundances of freedoms which can be counterproductive -- as Will Durant has noted, if you've got a choice between an excess of order or an excess of liberty, he'd choose order, because you still have order. (Mind, I'm not entirely convinced he's correct either.)
But generally: a right (conditional, empirically-based, predicated on an increase in overall social welfare) to privacy strikes me as something which, on balance, tends to promote rather than diminish preferred function of society as a whole. And a loss of that privacy generates highly negative consequences.
I'm les