Or you can bring your own certificate from someone like Let's Encrypt.
If CloudFlare wants to live dangerously with origin connections, fine... but give end users a way to drop the connection if it isn't secure, like our browsers would normally.
I'm not sure why he talks about absolutism, where this usage basically invalidates the whole point of TLS. This seems like an after-rationalization on why he chose to use CloudFlare, there is much more reasons not to use them. In the end of course it depend on what type of site you use it for.
The only way to make this "less bad" would be if there was a way to determine if the backend infrastructure was in fact loaded end-to-end via TLS. Perhaps some non-cachable content? Not sure what the right answer is here.
They're positively surfer hostile.
I don't have even the smallest idea how to configure one or what software I actually need, BUT, my greatest fear is that I'll end up with a pretty "broken internet" since I won't be using a residential IP anymore.
Cloudflare will just think that I broke into some random wordpress site and started using the server to ddos (who? with 1-2 requests/minute?).
It doesn't look that they implement any kind of serious IP reputation algorithm. I have a static residential address since I remember signing the contract, almost a decade ago, pretty paranoid about security with a clean PC and I never seem to stop getting captchas.
Is PIA a paid only service? I doubt any "hackers" will be using it to break cloudflare sites. On the contrary, I'd argue its users are actually more civilized than the residential folks.
I've no idea how clever CF are (tempted to quip clearly not clever enough) to decide their sites or their network is under attack. I'd imagine there's going to be a lot of connections from PIA's users, from all the various regional exits. Same for all the other VPN companies. I can't believe they can't be distinguished from a real DDOS or whatever else they see as "bad traffic".
Where Cloudflare start winding me up is they treat each domain alone. I get a captcha on blog a, 30 seconds later I'll get another at company b, 5s another at blog c. If CF gave me a 3 or 24 hour cookie I'd hate them so much less! (There's a couple of ways around captcha madness - If I switch to another exit I can usually get a captcha free one)
PIA is paid, but good value - around $35 a year.
It's easy to detect when Cloudflare is being used. There are multiple ways.
It sounds like Hunt expects to not see much interception and manipulation at the "backbone." My own experience suggests that such is common at national borders, and becoming common at more and more ISP borders.
Hunt seems to posit that the above ratio is small, I take it you disagree?
On a side note, I don't get why cloudflare doesn't let you pin a public key through their interface; that would remove the need for CA signing. Considering you have exactly one client (cloudflare) connecting to your server, it's not like key distribution is hard. Of course this is moot now that cloudflare offers you signed certificates for free, but would have been a simple solution.
1) using the real hostname of the website
2) using the hostname of the backend website - assuming you supply a url with a hostname to cloudflare. however, this hostname in the backend url is used in the Host header which ends up causing lots of problems.
3) using the hostname of the backend website - but the hostname of the real site is used in the Host header.
4) explicitly let you choose the servername you want to verify
imo. it would be nice if cloudflare gave you the option between 1) and 3) or 4).
EDIT: oh. just noticed the cloudflare reply with the link to: https://blog.cloudflare.com/cloudflare-ca-encryption-origin/
I.e. you generate your keypair and produce a self-signed certificate, you should be able to give your public key and the actual key would be used for authentication. The subject (and SANs) of the certificate are ignored so it could be like "/CN=localhost" - only the key material is what matters here. That would be secure - in a sense third-party attacker won't be able to sniff what's between you and CloudFlare.
(Or you could generate your own (self-signed) CA, generate a certificate signed by this CA of yours, and give CloudFlare your CA's public key. This makes sense if you have multiple hosts and you don't want to share the same key.)
Stepping on to soapbox... TLS needs to be replaced with something simpler, with fewer "buttons, dials and knobs". TLS pontificators need to separate authentication from encryption. They are two different problems, and it's possible we may only have a satisfactory solution for one of them. If that's the case, and it's the former problem that remains unsolved, then it could be worthwhile to reconsider the relative value of encrypted "channels" versus per packet encryption.
In particular, the "full" TLS they offer that Hunt is taking advantage of (because he can't deploy a working certificate) is grievously insecure: he's essentially running his system on top of the equivalent of the "goto fail" vulnerability in Safari that the Internet was (justifiably) freaking out about two years ago.
Hunt is smart about a whole lot of things, but he's wrong about this. There's nothing "unhealthy" about the absolutism here: you either have end-to-end cryptographic security, or you're vulnerable.