Re:Mitigating MIME Confusion Attacks in Firefox
by Arnavion on Friday August 26, 2016 @12:28PM
(#12367333)
nosniff is opt-in for websites that want the security benefit. If they do that and still irresponsibly send the wrong content type then I can't sympathize with them.
Re:Mitigating MIME Confusion Attacks in Firefox
by gsnedders on Friday August 26, 2016 @12:44PM
(#12367452)
Every single browser vendor has exit polling showing websites being broken is one of the top reasons for users changing browser. This isn't some idea, we have solid data that breaking stuff just causes users to move to a browser where the site works.
Re:Mitigating MIME Confusion Attacks in Firefox
by jhatax on Friday August 26, 2016 @01:12PM
(#12367678)
This.
Most users do not think that their favorite website is broken; the believe the browser is at fault. Therefore, they find a browser that renders said website correctly and stick with it. The problems are manifold, and it's the browser that supports both the standard and many non-standard ways of describing content that wins out: Chrome today; IE before the "second coming of web browsers".
Re:Mitigating MIME Confusion Attacks in Firefox
by drdaeman on Saturday August 27, 2016 @06:26PM
(#12374439)
Is this also backed by research?
Because I sort of doubt this. An old browsers become a nuisance quite fast, with "sorry, you need a browser that supports $feature and yours doesn't". Well, I mean, I had to stick with 2 years old browser for some time and this certainly wasn't a good UX.
Re:Mitigating MIME Confusion Attacks in Firefox
by drdaeman on Saturday August 27, 2016 @09:43AM
(#12372311)
Of course, it's true. Yet, I hope, no one would argue this is also exactly how we ended up with a giant pile of hacks. ;)
The only solution I can think of is a cartel-like agreements between all major browser vendors, on issue-per-issue basis, when they decide they want a sane tech and for the sake of it won't compete on certain compatibility points. Which is quite unlikely.
Re:Mitigating MIME Confusion Attacks in Firefox
by _RPM on Friday August 26, 2016 @10:10AM
(#12366356)
I remember trying to explain that checking the file extension of a file doesn't mean that it is actually an "image" file. I was an intern at my first internship, but wasn't taken seriously when I proposed [to the senior dev] that we do actual file validation (bytes) and not just extension validation for the uploaded images. Yes, it would take more time. But, since I was just low on the pole, I think I wasn't taken seriously.
Also maybe it wasn't my place to suggest design solutions, and or my approach wasn't as good as it should have been.
Re:Mitigating MIME Confusion Attacks in Firefox
by Flimm on Friday August 26, 2016 @11:49AM
(#12367043)
What Mozilla is proposing here is that metadata (the mime header if not the filename) is respected and guessing based on the contents is eliminated. So the proposal is more similar to your professor's idea than to yours.
Re:Mitigating MIME Confusion Attacks in Firefox
by hannob on Friday August 26, 2016 @09:39AM
(#12366113)
This is not a mozilla invention. The only thing Mozilla should be ciriticzed for is that they are the last implementing this. All other browsers already support this header.
It's a bad situation, but it's based on bad decisions that were made in the 90s when the web was in its early days ("be liberal what you accept"). Hard to fix in a general way without breaking lots of stuff.
Re:Mitigating MIME Confusion Attacks in Firefox
by erlehmann_ on Friday August 26, 2016 @09:12AM
(#12365924)
To me it looks like the actual security problem is that the browser does not trust the server, using its own heuristics instead. Mozilla asserts that as well:
> While MIME sniffing increases the web experience for the majority of users, it also opens up an attack vector known as MIME confusion attack.
The header tells the browser to stop shenanigans and behave.
Re:Mitigating MIME Confusion Attacks in Firefox
by tptacek on Friday August 26, 2016 @08:49AM
(#12365797)
In practice it's very easy for most teams to make a policy decision about whether they want to disable content sniffing (most teams probably do) and then simply add a header to responses; in many organizations, that can happen without code changes.
On the other hand, doing an inventory and then auditing every place where user-controlled content is replayed and then making and testing the requisite code changes is usually very difficult, and sometimes untenable.
2) realize people are not using the standard correctly, disregard the specified type and auto-detect the type.
3) realize this creates a security problem, adopt a new standard that adds a stronger MIME type specification.
4) go to 2)
What does 'increases the web experience' even mean? Using a phrase like that is clear evidence of confusion.
Browsers should obey the media type they receive, per the context in which they receive it; content-sniffing is just wrong.
Yeah, it means that the brokenness of broken sites will be made evident to users. Broken sites are broken, news at 11.
And that's the story how we stuck with a giant pile of hacks the modern web is.
Most users do not think that their favorite website is broken; the believe the browser is at fault. Therefore, they find a browser that renders said website correctly and stick with it. The problems are manifold, and it's the browser that supports both the standard and many non-standard ways of describing content that wins out: Chrome today; IE before the "second coming of web browsers".
Because I sort of doubt this. An old browsers become a nuisance quite fast, with "sorry, you need a browser that supports $feature and yours doesn't". Well, I mean, I had to stick with 2 years old browser for some time and this certainly wasn't a good UX.
The only solution I can think of is a cartel-like agreements between all major browser vendors, on issue-per-issue basis, when they decide they want a sane tech and for the sake of it won't compete on certain compatibility points. Which is quite unlikely.
Also maybe it wasn't my place to suggest design solutions, and or my approach wasn't as good as it should have been.
I wonder if they ever evaluate the effectiveness of their work over there at Mozilla.
It's a bad situation, but it's based on bad decisions that were made in the 90s when the web was in its early days ("be liberal what you accept"). Hard to fix in a general way without breaking lots of stuff.
> While MIME sniffing increases the web experience for the majority of users, it also opens up an attack vector known as MIME confusion attack.
The header tells the browser to stop shenanigans and behave.
On the other hand, doing an inventory and then auditing every place where user-controlled content is replayed and then making and testing the requisite code changes is usually very difficult, and sometimes untenable.