I think a lot of the productivity mystery lies is due to artifacts in the shitty tools we have. For example, GDP is like the Dow Jones indices: designed to be easy to calculate with pencil and paper, plagued by necessary changes in their own baselines over time (mostly: what is counted and what is not), not terribly reflective of what we really want to know, and yet it would be stupid to discard them because we'd lose any time series. Everybody knows they are broken but nobody has any idea yet what would be better.
It's not like I have a great idea of what we should be using instead ettither. But I fell it's foolish to say "we have strong qualitative signals but since we can't find them in our model they are bogus". Especially since we all know our current theories are woefully incomplete and perhaps even inaccurate.
Those who don't see the productivity advance aren't idiots: those who, like me, believe in those signals justifiably have a large hurdle to leap.
While the article doesn't explicitly mention it, I'd assume that they're looking at productivity in real, not nominal figures, precisely to disentangle the effects of inflation.
Meaningful comparison across countries requires purchase power parity (PPP) exchange rates, rather than market exchange rates. However, this article doesn't really talk about other countries at all, so I don't understand why you bring up PPP here. If fewer hours of labour are required to buy dinner, that's just real wages, nothing to do with PPP...
And how does lower labour force participation enter? (If we assume that less productive workers drop out first, that should increase productivity, btw - which we don't see...)