Researchers crack open malware that hid for 5 years

Re:Researchers crack open malware that hid for 5 years by viraptor on Tuesday August 09, 2016 @07:41PM (#12258448)

This scales to ${number_of_devices_you_can_see}. A hundred or more? Easier to manage remotely. You're also likely to have a very limited number of models in that case.

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Re:Researchers crack open malware that hid for 5 years by acdha on Wednesday August 10, 2016 @10:13PM (#12265952)

One thing to keep in mind is that the kind of place which cares about things this much tends to be the kind of place which can hire staff — and it's a lot cheaper to hire technicians who can verify that epoxy plug than the security engineers who can confirm that you've done everything right in software.

Consider another instance of the problem: verifying that your webcam isn't being used to spy on you. Since a surprising number of hardware designers were negligent and made that software controllable it is orders of magnitude easier to simply deploy a piece of tape than try to prove that malware hasn't disabled the status LED:

http://security.stackexchange.com/questions/6758/can-webcams... http://blog.erratasec.com/2013/12/how-to-disable-webcam-ligh...

How much skill and diligence does it take to confirm that you have disabled the controller using each manufacturer's interface (if they even have one documented), that there isn't some way to re-enable it later (or that something like a sleep/resume cycle didn't reset the controller), and that all of that continues to be true for every subsequent configuration change or software/firmware update?

I would suggest that any organization with this level of risk would be better off paying someone $15/hour to check the ports along with the rest of their physical status checks and put the security engineers in charge of other improvements with a higher return.

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Re:Researchers crack open malware that hid for 5 years by krylon on Wednesday August 10, 2016 @06:59AM (#12260725)

The thing is, if you manage those things remotely, so can an attacker. I imagine it would not be impossible for a sufficiently skilled and determined attacker to remotely re-enable the USB ports.

If you are paranoid enough or have actual reason to believe somebody would want to invade your network, epoxy is one way you can be really certain no one can hijack your network via an infected USB flash drive.

EDIT: Of course, if gluing the USB ports shut is all you do stop attackers, I am pretty much begging for trouble. And as somebody pointed out, disconnecting the USB ports from the main board, possibly disabling the pins is probably a better idea, as well as disabling the USB controller in firmware and locking the BIOS / setup, if it is part of a ... let's say comprehensive approach to securing your network.

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