Romes decline related to the rate information traveled and the need for several people at the top. The eastern roman empire lasted well after the sacking of Rome. But, Rome had fallen several times before this it just being called Rome. The difference is we equate the city with the empire, but the US for example moved it's capital and nobody thinks in terms of the fall of Philadelphia or even fall of the US in 1814 when DC burned.
The Byzantine Empire aka Eastern Roman Empire even covered "Rome" ~550 growing and falling at various points until 1,400.
IMO, it's not really the empires decline we are talking about so much as the city's decline.
For example: they got rid of the entire centralized military bureaucracy and replaced it with the Theme system ( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theme_(Byzantine_district)#Org... ) which was basically a sort of farmer's military club franchise where farmers where also in the military and bought their own weapons and also conducted civil affairs. This held off invading muslim hordes for hundreds of years. They also replaced the massive central administration with a very minimalist king and court. They basically did a massive corporate re-org and decentralization to save the empire. It's a pattern that not many civilizations have pulled off.
Asian armies = hordes
European armies = armies?
They certainly weren't a Muslim army, though.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mongol_military_tactics_and_or...
Some of the Arabian tribes (and later in central Asia) were nomadic, but few of the Muslim groups attacking Europe were.
The core of the Ottoman army that conquered Constantinople was made up of their Janissaries[1], a large majority of whom were European.
The Muslim Seljuk empire grew from Nomadic tribes, but didn't really threaten Europe.[2]
The Umayyad Caliphate was a well organised, centralised empire by the time they invaded Spain.
Wolfram points out that before the Migration Age began in earnest, the Eastern Empire was spending more in the military (and that was only 30% of the budget) than the Western Empire was collecting in taxes, and the issue was, in the West, that the Senatorial families had achieved such a monopoly on wealth and power that they both couldn't be effectively taxed and controlled the economy. Some families had a budget that was as high as a third of the whole Western Empire's budget (suggesting it is likely that some families had businesses which were consuming more than the Western Roman military). According to Wolfram, this was not the same in the East.
Nonetheless, the East found its military too expensive during the Arab wars and that's where the Theme System came from.
The perspectives of Tainter and Wolfram are not unrelated. Complexity usually does concentrate power and resources in coordinator roles, and that concentration itself cannot be maintained without complexity -- remember that the fall of Rome effectively meant the transition of the role of slave into a role of peasant simply because central enforcement of slavery could no longer really occur. But at the same time the Ostrogoths could not challenge the powerful families enough to hold Italy for more than a couple of centuries before the Eastern Empire invaded and the Goths fell for the same reasons (according to Wolfram) that the Romans did.
Regarding the article, one of the problems not discussed is the issue of economic concentration. These breakthroughs usually demand that. The industrial revolution wasn't caused by population, but by concentration of economic power in a few hands and the quite intentional efforts to evict peasants from their lands and make them destitute factory workers.
Imagine, if instead of Britain, we'd have had a different power guiding the direction of the world --different philosophies and priorities. As well as a different language for thinking.
And who wants to chime in their two cents about what the USA's "trick" is in maintaining its global pre-eminence?
On the question of whether there's a singular trick that's exploited, I'm not aware of anything in Tainter's writing that suggests this at all. There is the concept of Leibig's Law of the Minimum -- the idea that for any system (Leibig is speaking of ecosystems or populations) there's some one factor which imposes a constraint on the system. In that regard, you could could likely look at a single technology which is the operative constraint. But if you're looking at a complex system with multiple modes of failure, you'd be arguing precisely the opposite: that there are multiple technological tricks which aren't presently binding constraints but which, if any one of them failed, would rapidly become one.
There's no basis that the trick need be unique. I'd argue that they're anything but. Basic modalities include agriculture, construction, fire, transport, arms or weapons, and control over hygiene factors.
The United States' trick was in large part massive overwhelming self-sufficiency in resources, most especially energy.
See Vaclav Smil, Energy in World History, Manfred Weissenbacher, Sources of Power: How energy forges human history, or Robert Ayres, The Economic Growth Engine: How energy and work drive material prosperity.
http://www.worldcat.org/title/energy-in-world-history/oclc/3...
http://www.worldcat.org/title/sources-of-power-how-energy-fo...
http://www.worldcat.org/title/economic-growth-engine-how-ene...
Sometimes a technological breakthrough, like the development of the steam engine in Britain, will reverse the decline and lead to a whole new civilizational development curve.
The theory is independent of population levels and so is not a Malthusian derivative, like most of the popular ones that have been in fashion since the 1970s. I think Tainter's approach is different and unique because he's an anthropologist and not an economist. For example, the total collapse of Rome, the historic civilization most similar to our own, was not caused by environmental factors, but by diminishing marginal returns that eventually went negative of the "conquer and extract tribute" methodology of the Roman empire.