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Re:Why we use OpenBSD at VidiGuard by marios on Sunday July 24, 2016 @08:25AM (#12153131)
The key word is "by default". I have no idea whether the Linux kernel that each distro ships enforced W^X. For userland, the effort is undergoing. For instance, I recently packaged a C application for Debian. Then, by sheer luck I stumbled upon the Debian Wiki[0] where it explained that one needs to specify "DEB_BUILD_MAINT_OPTIONS = hardening=+all" to enable compiler hardening options.

Why isn't that on by default ? The wiki asks the reader to enable hardening if the program handles untrusted data. Doesn't that apply to 99% of the applications out there ? Even it only reads its own configuration file, there is a possibility of a bug in the parser. Why take the risk at all ? Enable it by default for everyone and be done with it.

Regarding the pledge(2) sandboxing, pretty much every userland application in the base install of OpenBSD where is makes sense to sandbox is using pledge. Ports/packages are another story entirely.

[0] https://wiki.debian.org/Hardening#Using_Hardening_Options

Re:Why we use OpenBSD at VidiGuard by ryuuchin on Sunday July 24, 2016 @09:01AM (#12153191)
Arch Linux enables -fstack-protector-strong last I checked by default. I admit Debian often drags it feet on some things like this but I think Ubuntu has enabled it for a number of packages as well.
Re:Why we use OpenBSD at VidiGuard by marios on Sunday July 24, 2016 @10:06AM (#12153333)
And there lies the difference: "a number of packages" for Ubuntu/Debian, all packages and base software on OpenBSD.