Why isn't that on by default ? The wiki asks the reader to enable hardening if the program handles untrusted data. Doesn't that apply to 99% of the applications out there ? Even it only reads its own configuration file, there is a possibility of a bug in the parser. Why take the risk at all ? Enable it by default for everyone and be done with it.
Regarding the pledge(2) sandboxing, pretty much every userland application in the base install of OpenBSD where is makes sense to sandbox is using pledge. Ports/packages are another story entirely.
[0] https://wiki.debian.org/Hardening#Using_Hardening_Options
>Linux
Well grsecurity's mmap protections are a strict superset of OpenBSD's W^X which we've had for what 10 years now?
>Literally every other OS out there has stack protector, and it was Windows pushing it to wide adoption
I don't know when OpenBSD or Linux distro's were starting to add SSP support but stack protection/BSC (buffer security checks) have been enabled by default in every Visual Studio version since (at least) 2005. The mitigation has been improved over the years as well.
DEP and ASLR became default in 2008 (not really relevant here though).
Let's see.
>Enforced W^X in the kernel
Linux, OS X, Windows
>Enforced W^X userland as of 6.0
Linux
>Stack protector (..which OpenBSD pushed into wide adoption).
Literally every other OS out there has stack protector, and it was Windows pushing it to wide adoption
>PIE by default for base and ports.
Linux
>Static-PIE for self-relocating static binaries.
Linux
>SROP (sigreturn(2) oriented programming) mitigation by default.
Useless "mitigation", can be easily bypassed with no effort
>C shared library re-ordering at boot time, i.e: libc.so is re-linked at boot time so objects are randomly ordered.
Useless mitigation, can be easily bypassed with no effort
>System-wide sandboxing (pledge(2)) of a large percentage of the userland
Large percentage? I disagree, it's more like 10%.