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Re:Decoding the MetroCard, Part 2: Research and Past Attempts by Fej on Monday July 18, 2016 @03:39PM (#12117570)
Expensive.

Expensive expensive expensive.

They would have to replace all of the turnstiles (for some reason I doubt they could retrofit them) which is a ton of turnstiles. The MTA subway is BIG (as far as I know, bigger than SF and Boston, in terms of number of stations).

They would need dedicated central servers to handle everything, unlike they have now, which the article says "complements" the existing system but which is not required for operation.

MetroCard came out over a decade before CharlieCard (Boston) so they have tons of infrastructure that would cost an absurd amount of money to replace. I imagine they figure it isn't worth it, especially when there are so many other subway projects that need money.

Re:Decoding the MetroCard, Part 2: Research and Past Attempts by tjohns on Monday July 18, 2016 @04:57PM (#12118020)
Central servers are not required for contactless cards. The card itself holds the current balance inside a tamper-proof secure element, and it's updated with every ride.

A central server can be used for things like web-based reloads and auditing, complementing the system... but it's entirely possible for a terminal to remain in offline-mode and just check-in at the end of the day to get any pending messages and upload logs. This is why it takes longer to reload/unblock a SF Clipper card using a reader in a bus (offline mode) as opposed to at a BART turnstile (online mode).

Re:Decoding the MetroCard, Part 2: Research and Past Attempts by tetrep on Monday July 18, 2016 @05:12PM (#12118090)
> ...tamper-proof secure element...

It doesn't even need to be held in anything secure, you just need to sign the balance when writing and check the signature when it's used.

Re:Decoding the MetroCard, Part 2: Research and Past Attempts by throwanem on Monday July 18, 2016 @06:30PM (#12118407)
If your turnstiles can't talk to a server, they can't check key revocation lists, and I tend to imagine that in a city the size of New York somebody's going to leak a key every now and again - it's been known to happen with physical keys; why not digital ones, too?
Re:Decoding the MetroCard, Part 2: Research and Past Attempts by dsr_ on Monday July 18, 2016 @07:24PM (#12118576)
But they don't need to have a realtime revocation list -- it's fine if a broken card works until the end of the day, or even the end of the week, as long as it stops working faster than keys are leaked or cracked.

So a bus turnstile can do transactions when it returns to the garage, and turnstiles in locations where it's hard to run data for whatever reason can get a plug-in every so often on a regular maintenance run.

Re:Decoding the MetroCard, Part 2: Research and Past Attempts by shaftway on Monday July 18, 2016 @06:19PM (#12118364)
What's your replay attack mitigation strategy?