One of the points in that and article jacquesm linked is that checksum verification still requires trusting the transport. Otherwise, you get fake binary plus fake checksum that then look safe but were for malicious app. There's just an extra thing to change for attacker. No work at all given what was already put in to get to that point.
So, trustworthy transport of binary and/or checksum is necessary. The checksum should still be there even if binary is sent safely, though, to verify no corruption of binary happened due to transmission or storage faults.
My initial point is that no matter the solutions offered, the user has to care about checking. Forcing HTTPS transport for the download isn't really going to make it any more secure because it's still possible the file is illegitimate and you should be testing the signatures.
tl;dr: Arch's downloads are over HTTP, the checksums and signature are over HTTPS and on the official download page.
For example, Arch has HTTP downloads but the download page provides the MD5SUM, SHA1SUM, and PGP signature for verification that the files are correct. I just don't really see this as that big of an issue right now. Even if one has provided instructions for doing so it's still going to require that the end user cares about checking the validity of the files.