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Re:The sad state of Linux download security by nickpsecurity on Sunday July 17, 2016 @12:27PM (#12110669)
The table in the link isn't alarmist: it's alarming. Secure distribution... at least an effort... was a requirement in INFOSEC since the Orange Book in 90's. FOSS proponents pushed Linux distro's, and still do, for the foundation of security-oriented projects. This is 2016. They still don't have trustworthy distribution under control except Fedora apparently. It's worth noting.

Anyone wanting to build on this should apply same methodology to major BSD's to see how they compare.

Re:The sad state of Linux download security by Etzos on Sunday July 17, 2016 @12:43PM (#12110734)
I don't think the table really covers the everything quite well enough. In reality it doesn't really matter if the download is over HTTP or HTTPS as long as you can safely verify that the file you have is indeed the correct file.

For example, Arch has HTTP downloads but the download page provides the MD5SUM, SHA1SUM, and PGP signature for verification that the files are correct. I just don't really see this as that big of an issue right now. Even if one has provided instructions for doing so it's still going to require that the end user cares about checking the validity of the files.

Re:The sad state of Linux download security by nickpsecurity on Sunday July 17, 2016 @01:24PM (#12110891)
"Arch has HTTP downloads but the download page provides the MD5SUM, SHA1SUM, and PGP signature for verification that the files are correct. I just don't really see this as that big of an issue right now."

One of the points in that and article jacquesm linked is that checksum verification still requires trusting the transport. Otherwise, you get fake binary plus fake checksum that then look safe but were for malicious app. There's just an extra thing to change for attacker. No work at all given what was already put in to get to that point.

So, trustworthy transport of binary and/or checksum is necessary. The checksum should still be there even if binary is sent safely, though, to verify no corruption of binary happened due to transmission or storage faults.

Re:The sad state of Linux download security by Etzos on Sunday July 17, 2016 @02:19PM (#12111110)
The checksums and PGP signature are on the HTTPS page which links to all the downloads. You have to trust that page from the start no matter what (or establish the PGP signature trust from other ways, which is quite possible just far more involved) because that's the source of all downloads and anything there could be faked from mirror links to checksums to PGP signature (assuming no trust chain is actually established by the user).

My initial point is that no matter the solutions offered, the user has to care about checking. Forcing HTTPS transport for the download isn't really going to make it any more secure because it's still possible the file is illegitimate and you should be testing the signatures.

tl;dr: Arch's downloads are over HTTP, the checksums and signature are over HTTPS and on the official download page.

Re:The sad state of Linux download security by danieldk on Sunday July 17, 2016 @03:17PM (#12111344)
FreeBSD: Signed checksums are linked from the same table as the ISOs on the download page:

https://www.freebsd.org/where.html https://www.freebsd.org/releases/10.3R/signatures.html

Downloads are via FTP by default, but I agree with those that HTTPS cannot be trusted either. Signatures plus building up key trust is the way to go.

Hopefully Keybase.io will make it easier in the future to establish trust in such keys.

Re:The sad state of Linux download security by RaleyField on Sunday July 17, 2016 @05:30PM (#12111943)
> except Fedora apparently

I don't know fedora, but when I tried to switch I found the following blocking issue. Fedora has packages missing that you can get in Ubuntu (irc it was vlc for me). There is RPM Fusion but it doesn't have reliable method of verifying repo keys - they send instructions only over http and have only selfsigs on keys. As this has been going on for years and without bothering anyone I can't trust them even if they fix it sometime in the future.

Re:The sad state of Linux download security by clarry on Sunday July 17, 2016 @03:07PM (#12111306)
I would not apply the same methodology. I would prefer that anyone building on this apply sane methodology. Otherwise people will get the wrong idea.
Re:The sad state of Linux download security by nickpsecurity on Sunday July 17, 2016 @04:13PM (#12111594)
Do you have any specific recommendations to improve their methodology?