For Counter Strike, sure. But for things like spreadsheets or web browsers, hundreds of thousands or millions of people working in arms manufacture or intelligence are going to be using your software and it needs to not leak designs to foreign intelligence agencies or competitors.
I started off talking about the browser, not the F-35, but by the end the line blurred. :-)
Then use Qubes OS:
You can set up a separate VM in Qubes OS purely for browsing. That way, even if your browser was compromised, it would be isolated from your other applications.
I completely disagree: security is the foundation of any software system. Without security, the system simply cannot be trusted to do anything correctly, not even add 1 and 1 together. For far too long we've relied on our systems being accidentally correct rather than deliberately secure; we need to fix that.
If something's mathematically possible, then it will happen. We need to build systems where security flaws are impossible, because then … they won't happen.
> So I personally consider security bugs to be just "normal bugs". I don't cover them up, but I also don't have any reason what-so-ever to think it's a good idea to track them and announce them as something special.
Linus Torvalds - http://yarchive.net/comp/linux/security_bugs.html
Here's a lengthier article about it - http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/business/2015/11/05/net-of-...
Not really. For a simple example, imagine a calculator software which has been mathematically proven to work correctly for any number with 30 or less digits, but which overflows a fixed-size buffer if the user inputs a number with more than 30 digits. That software could absolutely be trusted to add 1 and 1 together, while still having a security issue.
Java applets are another example of security competing with features. Any part of the runtime could cause an exploit. If the sandbox had been separate it would've been safer.
I am sorry, security guys, but unless it's military-grade software, security is just another feature. And it is not a highest priority one. Of course, security would be easier if there were no new features or spec changes. And software development in general would be much easier if there weren't any of those pesky end users.
Which is a good thing, probably. Otherwise, you'd be mostly out of your jobs. Security is always changing, chaotic battlefront.
Having said that, sandboxing is a good idea. Theoretically. But it is really hard to implement right — attack surface on the edges of the boxes is quite large. Remember those Java applets? They were sandboxed neck-deep, with excellent security model. Did it help?