The problem is that being able to modify the page is a method of exfiltrating information - e.g. you can add an img tag triggering a GET to an arbitrary URL. I suspect it would be surprisingly tricky to try restricting page modification in such a way that information can't be sent anywhere the page wouldn't have sent it originally.
But +1 on deferring permissions prompts until the moment the app actually needs the privilege, though. It's worked pretty well on iOS, and it's finally coming to Android - maybe it'll come to Chrome or Firefox next.
This seems like an API failure that common jobs for extensions can't be done without scary permissions.
edit: since content blockers in particular are so popular, it might even make sense for them to create a security-conscious content blocker specific API like Apple did
Google’s not rushing to implement this for obvious reasons. They will most likely continue to push AMP and at some point decide to block “malicious ads” or whatever, so that in one move they can both cut out the competition (by being the de facto arbiter of acceptable ad technology) and make sure they don’t negatively affect their business.
It’s still a net positive for the user, at least in the short term.
Adding, or modifying any DOM node, to the effect that it includes third-party resources could be denied.
If you also deny adding inline <script> blocks and enforce any injected javascript to run in strict CSP mode it could potentially work.
I believe that's the idea. To make the permissions more finer grained. However, that crosses the line of what can be automatically enforced by sandboxing -- chrome's permissions model is defined by what they can restrict via software. To make it more finer-grained, you need a review process, which Firefox has.
Do you mean an English description, provided by the plugin? That would be useless. Malware is hardly going to come out and say that it needs permission to modify all requests so that it can hijack your connection.
If you mean a description that tries to read from what the code is doing why it needs the permissions, that's not much different from just "This app needs access to your location Yes/No?" Inferring "reason" from request patterns isn't going to work.
For one, extensions should be able to include an explanation why they need each permission.
Network access should be a separate permission like it is for iOS keyboards. It's safer for an ad blocker to read and modify a page if it has no method of exfiltrating the content. Blacklist updates can be done through the regular extension update mechanism.
Looking at the list of permissions in the documentation, a lot of these look like they should be asked for at the time of first use (location, clipboard, screenshots, etc). This would avoid the problem of asking for overly broad permissions upfront "just in case". Android had the same problem.
But in the end, not informing the user is the wrong choice, no matter how bullet-proof you think your vetting process is. You'll always have users who are paranoid (as developers of a camera app on iOS, we've had 1-star reviews left because our app "uploads all your photos to the internet" because we need photo library access) and it's their loss mainly, not yours.