https://developer.android.com/preview/api-overview.html#jit_...
Compiled once is easier to develop, prove correct and validate functionality. Just in time offers convenience in deferring compilation, but increases storage requirements and can decrease the initial runtime performance due to compiling the code. If you have spare cores this starts to make more sense. If you have a mechanism of profiling and automatically tuning the optimization of frequently used codepaths / infrequently used ones then JIT also starts to have payoffs (this is where human hours making a smarter compiler pay off across many applications that don't warrant the human hours optimizing directly).
Not only that, but Android N will be able to boot all the way to the lock screen before asking for the password, and even support functionality like phone calls, limited notifications, or alarms (so if your phone reboots in the night you'll still get woken up in the morning).
There could still be a short pin/passphrase in addition to that. Keepass allows for something similar by having a local file + passphrase to unlock a password vault.
Backups of the QR code could be as easy as photocopying it!
That has the same issue of not being able to input it into the phone. The QR code can be easily scanned.
Sure OCR of plain text is possible but some more standardized like a QR Code would be better.
Nothing says you can't do either, or even both[1]. The idea of using a QR Code is so that mom/dad/grandpa/grandma can use a long password to unlock their phone without having to type it in.
Bonus points if the QR Code itself is in the shape of a key!
[1]: Which would be "something you have" + "something you know".
So, that's where you need the secure cryptographic processor and the trusted environment, etc.
Argh. Just give me a stinkin' smartphone that runs Linux. These are solved problems, people.
What may be protected through other means is the key used to encrypt that filesystem. The user enters a pin or a pattern to unlock said key on boot, and that key is used to initiate LUKS.
Maybe that's what they have cracked here?
So it doesn't track the latest, but it's also not "really old" in that upstream Linux still considers it a supported version.
$ uname -a
Linux localhost 3.10.73-gef93fe9 #1 SMP PREEMPT Fri May 20 20:48:13 UTC 2016 aarch64 Android
There was a technical reason for pinning it at this version (also known the "Android kernel"), but I don't remember what that specific reason was.Even if you have a strong passphrase, there's some probability of leaking some number of bits of it via side-channels every time it's entered (e.g. surveillance cameras, fingerprints on the screen, shoulder surfing, vulnerable code, TEMPEST, etc). Plus, people often keep a backup copy of their passphrases (unique, strong passphrases are hard to remember), so there's also a cumulative risk of the backup leaking over time, as well.
Long-term confidentiality is just surprisingly hard in the real world.
Most of the secutity is pretty much a UX issue. Otherwise century-old one-time pad would fit all.
A simple, working, FDE setup would be something like LUKS running at boot:
If the master key has enough entropy, brute forcing it becomes impossible. The phone won't "disable" as there's no self-destructing component (i.e. "secure crypto chip") but that doesn't mean it can be cracked. Boil as many oceans as you'd like, you're not going to brute force 256 bits of entropy.The UX problem is that the master key is a PITA to enter if it's long enough to be cryptographically secure. That's what a crypto chip is supposed to solve. A limited number of attempts with a shorter passphrase.