And statistics is not just probability. Frequentist inference is based on procedures that "behave well" in the long term, but may or may not make sense for the particular outcome at hand.
For example, a 95% confidence interval calculated using a procedure that guarantees that the interval contains the true value 95% of the time may yield an interval that cannot contain the true value (for example the interval covers only negative values and the true value is known to be positive). See http://learnbayes.org/papers/confidenceIntervalsFallacy/ for a discussion of confidence intervals.
Another issue is related to how the "possible outcomes" are defined. For example, a frequentist analysis of the fairness of a coin after getting four heads and then a tail will be different depending on whether we decided to throw the coin until getting a tail or we had fixed beforehand the number of trials. Look for "stopping rules" or "optional stopping."
And I don't know what do you gain with that. Does your frequentist interpretation have a physical meaning? I could assign a Bayesian probability to panspermia, and you could assign a different probability. Is there, according to your equivalent definition in terms of frequencies, a "correct" probability?
A physical interpretation might be that all the other realities are realized in terms of the Many-worlds interpretation or in terms of Tegmark's level 4 multiverse. Without much information we cannot really nail down which reality we find ourselves in (cf. the sleeping beauty problem and Boltzmann brains). But we can use Bayesian updating to become more certain about what reality is about.
What do I gain from that? I am not entirely sure, but I find a probability is just better interpretable as frequency or fraction compared to a subjective quantity.
In the frequentist approach, a probability of 10% means that if you repeat an experiment many times, roughly 1 out of 10 times you will observe an event.
In Baysian statistics, a probability of 10% means that you are that certain about the event happening. So you would be willing to bet at 10 to 1 odds on the event happening. There doesn't have to be any repetition of the experiment for the probability to make sense. And as you can hopefully see, there is always a prior, that is, your belief about the event before doing any experiments.
P(H|D) = P(D|H) P(H) / P(D)
Bayesians are interested in the probablity of various hypotheses h in H given some data D.
Frequentists calculate the probability of some data given a hypothesis (p-value is not strictly a probability but it can be one - it is ALWAYS a measure of extremity of data coming from the assumed hypothesis, which can be considered a relative probability).
Most interesting to me is that the Bayesian formula includes P(D|H) which is basically what the frequentists are calculating. In this sense, the question Bayesians answer is far closer to what we want to ask and far more powerful. In practice, the frequentist approach is often more than enough, though. The tradeoff is computability and simplicity.
http://www.med.mcgill.ca/epidemiology/hanley/bios601/Gaussia...
What I am not quite seeing is how this has philosophical implications which divide the field into Frequentists and Bayesians. It rather seems that Bayesian statistics is just a frequentist method that is helpful for dealing with noisy measurements as one can always recover from a bad distributions using more updates.