Re:“During the investigation we noticed that you placed a sh...
by benmcnelly on Tuesday June 07, 2016 @04:56PM
(#11857751)
His argument makes sense to me as to why that was needed, however if they want to take that stance, thats understandable, as is people being less likely to run things down for them.
Re:“During the investigation we noticed that you placed a sh...
by i336_ on Wednesday June 08, 2016 @12:49AM
(#11860100)
An earlier comment said "Although the system() PHP function didn't directly work..." so it would probably have been phpinfo().
Authenticating something like this is an interesting question though. Maybe make the php script filename a sha256, then make the query string another sha256, and possibly add a few more sha256 query keys that have to match more sha256 strings. Or maybe that's overkill. (I keep wondering about cryptographic cipher-based solutions...)
As an aside, an attacker would have needed to know about the name `bugb.php`, which isn't an intuitive or easily guessable filename IMO, so there was a reasonable level of security-by-obscurity.
Re:“During the investigation we noticed that you placed a sh...
by lsaferite on Wednesday June 08, 2016 @08:55AM
(#11861897)
I've seen a colleague use a SHA1 hash as a filename to a phpinfo() script for sites as part of deployment. It's auto-generated for each instance and recorded for later use. While adding some additional layer, like a query param, would be even better, for read-only nature of the script it was deemed acceptable.
Re:“During the investigation we noticed that you placed a sh...
by i336_ on Wednesday June 08, 2016 @03:54AM
(#11860702)
It would probably have required a bit of thought, but PHP can access databases, (presumably) alter files, and the like; so while full UNIX shell access might not have been possible, practically speaking PHP could have done a lot of damage on its own.
Re:“During the investigation we noticed that you placed a sh...
by eridius on Tuesday June 07, 2016 @06:56PM
(#11858678)
Or even better, don't actually evaluate anything at all, just return a response indicating that the script could have chosen to evaluate the input if it wanted to.
> we noticed that you placed an unauthenticated web shell into our web root
(emphasis mine)
That being said, I imagine a phpinfo(); or passthru("whoami"); would have been preferred.
Authenticating something like this is an interesting question though. Maybe make the php script filename a sha256, then make the query string another sha256, and possibly add a few more sha256 query keys that have to match more sha256 strings. Or maybe that's overkill. (I keep wondering about cryptographic cipher-based solutions...)
As an aside, an attacker would have needed to know about the name `bugb.php`, which isn't an intuitive or easily guessable filename IMO, so there was a reasonable level of security-by-obscurity.
Assuming you aren't referring to a SSH-2 implementation like OpenSSH, do you have any examples of something like this?
If they knew about it, it's pretty irresponsible to not mention on their patch notes. I'm assuming they fixed it by accident?
Step 2: browse
Step 3: profit, literally
I'm considering looking around at bug bounties... I know nada about security, but who knows, maybe I'll stumble on something.