Re:Stanford quantifies the privacy-stripping power of metadata
by arca_vorago on Tuesday May 17, 2016 @01:07PM
(#11715280)
The real problem with issues like this is that while I have chosen to remove myself from certain social media (have a facebook but it's poisoned data), is that friends and family aren't as paranoid or knowledgeable about privacy implications as I am, so I have to remind people to not tag me, not upload photos of me, etc.
Friends and family are reporting on their friends and family without even understanding the implications of what they are doing.
It may seem benign at the moment, but given the nature of the turn-key totalitarian state, it's when that key gets turned and the cat starts getting walked back that this sort of information leakage from unexpected sources really becomes an issue.
Re:Stanford quantifies the privacy-stripping power of metadata
by ljk on Tuesday May 17, 2016 @01:20PM
(#11715404)
Good point, and facebook generates "phantom profiles" for people without an account too to make the data gathering even easier for them
Re:Stanford quantifies the privacy-stripping power of metadata
by arca_vorago on Tuesday May 17, 2016 @01:22PM
(#11715425)
It does, hence why I suggest people manage their own but spike the data... and be sure to use tor or similar to connect. (Which I only check every six months or so, just to make sure facebook doesn't try to pull any more "oh hey, we made your entire profile public" stunts again.)
Re:Stanford quantifies the privacy-stripping power of metadata
by dredmorbius on Tuesday May 17, 2016 @01:44PM
(#11715651)
How and what do you check for?
Re:Stanford quantifies the privacy-stripping power of metadata
by arca_vorago on Wednesday May 18, 2016 @10:39AM
(#11722283)
Just review privacy settings, check for tags from friends, simple stuff.
Probably would be safer to not publicize your every move publicly too, even if it'd only slow the process down a little