[0]-https://tutanota.uservoice.com/knowledgebase/articles/470795...
In addition to not having forward secrecy (if a 3rd party gets his crypto password, they get ALL of my messages to him), this seems to fail the classic "In order to exchange a secret, first exchange a secret" crypto usability test.
There is some voodoo in there about them storing your unencrypted mail encrypted on their server, but from that diagram it looks like it's only end to end between people registered with Tutanota (it looks like they may also allow federation, since they mention "or another service").
As for the "encrypted mailbox", what you are describing sounds to me like the decryption is done client-side using javascript (unless the recipient needs to download something in order to decrypt the mail), in which case I would consider that to be essentially insecure anyway, as that is also a "promise not to look". It's the same situation as Protonmail, which I personally consider to be crypto snakeoil.
You can use apps (iOS and Android) and even compile and install the client locally if you want to.
There will also be apps for Windows and MacOS in the future.
If you mean a local server using the github code, it's a fair enough point - it's more complicated and likely insecure than using PGP, but at least the burden of complexity and security falls on the power user.
Presumably that passphrase would be shared out-of-band to prevent Tutanota peeking, at which point... Why bother sending an e-mail at all?
Is this promising end-to-end encryption over email even if one of the two parties is not using Tutanota?