All of that redundency makes it possible to build some really robust flight envelope systems that keep the airplane within safe margins.
* I should note that all of this applies to the A320 family, the systems have been developed even further in recent years. For example with the A350 Airbus made some steps towards allowing the flight computers to be used in Simulators so that the same software/hardware as on the real plane can be used.
> they use different software and hardware
Does this mean different architectures? If it does my respect for the redundant-hardware approach just went through the window.
Also, how is the watchdog redundant? I can't imagine there's only one; how does this work? Are both watchdogs somehow wired in parallel, are they cross-connected to each other, or...?
Also visible in the diagram is that each side has its own watchdog, both connected to each other. The way this whole thing work is fail safe, so if one computer fails the backup can jump in, and if that fails too the flight controls will either retract or stop in their current position depending on what makes the most sense. It’s also mirrored, so for example if spoiler 2 on the right wing fails and is retracted, spoiler 2 on the left wing will also retract.
Here is a description about the flight controls and how pilot input gets passed through to the control surfaces: http://www.smartcockpit.com/docs/A320-Flight_Controls.pdf
And here is a general overview about the architecture: http://www.skybrary.aero/bookshelf/books/2313.pdf
(I wonder if there are any systems built on multiple architectures where each unit is itself a redundant system with CPUs in lockstep.....)
Am I to intuit from this diagram that the watchdog watches all the components - power, I/O, memory, and CPU? That's very impressive. Or does it watch a central bus/backplane everything is connected to?
Also, how does either side decide/figure out the other side has failed? Simply deciding that the other half is wrong if it doesn't match this half's output could fail catastrophically if one of the sides reaches this conclusion after entering an invalid state (ie, it's the other side that is correct, and this side is wrong).
I'm also mildly curious as to why the I/O on one side has two connections to the actuators, while the other has only one.