Re:Why the S.E.C. didn't hit Goldman Sachs harder
by joe_the_user on Thursday April 21, 2016 @08:51PM
(#11546372)
Banks invest in Ex-regulators. As an ongoing investment, they would expect a payoff.
Also, a bank would prefer to reward the boss or co-workers who fires an over-zealous regulator to rewarding an over zealous regulator.
The whole absurdity you quote reads like something someone else hoping to be hired by a bank would write...
Re:Why the S.E.C. didn't hit Goldman Sachs harder
by dguaraglia on Thursday April 21, 2016 @11:08PM
(#11546820)
Written by Matt Levine, who has 3x the experience working as Associate and Vice President at Goldman Sachs than he had working in the public sector.
I'm usually pretty skeptical, but reading an article on "how hard regulators are on banks" from someone who worked at Goldman Sachs in the 2007-2011 period, I had to chuckle.
http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2014-06-26/strict-regu...
"Here are some possible theories of the financial-regulatory revolving door:
...
2. Regulators want to get higher-paying jobs at banks, so they try to be diligent, fair, competent and zealous, so that the banks are impressed by them and hire them.
3. Regulators want to get higher-paying jobs at banks, so they are hard on banks in ways that force the banks to hire lots of ex-regulators -- to understand complicated rules, say, or to work as monitors for regulatory settlements.
4. Regulators want to get higher-paying jobs at banks, so they are hard on banks in general, hoping that the banks will hire them to just shut them up."