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Re:Ubuntu 16.04 (Xenial Xerus) by avar on Thursday April 21, 2016 @10:30AM (#11542400)
You're conflating collision attacks like the Flame malware with a preimage attack that would be necessary to produce a malicious Ubuntu release with the same MD5SUM.

I.e. what's "broken" about MD5 is if you have a lot of CPU time and I allow you to give me two unrelated blobs, you can craft those blobs to have the same MD5 sum.

What's not "broken" (beyond a theoretical 2^123.4 attack) with MD5 and not broken at all for SHA1 is preimage attacks. E.g. if I work for Canonical, make an Ubuntu ISO and you have to produce a malicious ISO with the same MD5 sum.

We should be considerate of collision / preimage attacks, but please don't spread FUD by conflating the two. Publishing MD5 sums for ISOs is just fine.

Re:Ubuntu 16.04 (Xenial Xerus) by hatsunearu on Thursday April 21, 2016 @03:37PM (#11544825)
What? Pretty sure you're wrong.

Yes, MD5 preimage resistance is not broken (to a reasonable degree).

If you have the Ubuntu 16.04 ISO (you do), and if you have its hash, the attack to craft a different ISO with the same hash is a collision attack.

A preimage attack is if you had some hash y where y=H(x) where x is some file/whatever, and trying to find out possible values of u that give rise to y when you do H(u), without the knowledge of x.

Re:Ubuntu 16.04 (Xenial Xerus) by avar on Thursday April 21, 2016 @05:06PM (#11545350)
No. What you're describing is just a subset of preimage attacks.

Not having knowledge of x is just one type of preimage attack, a "preimage resistance". You can also know x, then it's a "second-preimage resistance".[1]

Which is not the same as a collision attack. Where you're trying to find x and y such that h(x) = h(y) without anyone specifying x or y in advance.

By definition a collision attack is an attack where you specifically craft both x and y such that they exploit weaknesses in the algorithm.

It's not enough to know an arbitrary x or y that someone else has made, because that value isn't going to be exploiting the weakness.

1. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Preimage_attack

Re:Ubuntu 16.04 (Xenial Xerus) by hatsunearu on Thursday April 21, 2016 @07:43PM (#11546106)
yeah, you're right. my bad.
Re:Ubuntu 16.04 (Xenial Xerus) by mceachen on Friday April 22, 2016 @12:40PM (#11550431)
(how many sites on the internet have a discussion where people are both patient and civil with each other, and the discussion results in mutual understanding?)
Re:Ubuntu 16.04 (Xenial Xerus) by hatsunearu on Sunday April 24, 2016 @10:48AM (#11559846)
Hmm, I personally haven't seen action in discussion where this kinda stuff doesn't happen; maybe I just pick the comments I reply well.
Re:Ubuntu 16.04 (Xenial Xerus) by nickodell on Thursday April 21, 2016 @11:28AM (#11542854)
You should think about this in terms of collision resistance. Canonical doesn't write most of the packages that go into a release.
Re:Ubuntu 16.04 (Xenial Xerus) by hansjorg on Thursday April 21, 2016 @12:33PM (#11543386)
How deterministic is the build process for an entire distro like this? And wouldn't updating just a single letter in a README just before release thwart the efforts of an external attacker?
Re:Ubuntu 16.04 (Xenial Xerus) by maaku on Thursday April 21, 2016 @11:22AM (#11542809)
Collision attacks matter if you don't (want to) trust the Ubuntu release team.
Re:Ubuntu 16.04 (Xenial Xerus) by Analemma_ on Thursday April 21, 2016 @11:27AM (#11542848)
If you don't trust the Ubuntu release team, why are you downloading Ubuntu to begin with? Your threat model makes no sense.
Re:Ubuntu 16.04 (Xenial Xerus) by maaku on Thursday April 21, 2016 @12:10PM (#11543217)
It is not trust in Canonical itself that is the problem, but the constant threat of coercion it puts on both the organization and the people that compromise it. This is why I work on generalized multi-signature schemes and deterministic builds.
Re:Ubuntu 16.04 (Xenial Xerus) by maaku on Saturday April 23, 2016 @11:37AM (#11555972)
s/compromise/comprise/