I wonder if this leaves the pilots too dependent on the computer and therefore didn't know how to fix the problems or if the computer itself caused the crash. I could be completely wrong about this. I don't have any experience with flying, I'm just putting out ideas.
As technologist we should have a healthy distrust of any software. It's simply too complex to predict.
Is it corporation group-think that causes them to ignore this? Or hubris? I can't imagine they are that stupid.
Where do you have any evidence for this? As the article points out, once the speed indicators diverged, the flight computer on AF447 put itself into an alternate mode where almost all of the overrides you refer to were turned off.
At that point you're basically flying the plane directly, except that hydraulics are moving the flight surfaces for you.
This is a design feature of modern FBW systems. It will not let the plane exit the safety envelope. Simply put, the pilot can put the plane through more acceleration than the frame can handle (the control surfaces are big enough), thus the plane could break apart at high speed without the FBW.
You are right for the rest, the flight computer passed control to the pilots after the loss of the pitot tubes.
There was a lot of FUD around fly by wire in the early days of Airbus, none of which ever panned out. So I'm asking you to justify your similar statements.
Hopefully Airbus issues an update that allows the computer to fail gracefully. And make it free so there will be high adoption.
All automated controls like this should be tested with each input in turn (a) disabled and (b) actively malicious, followed by two inputs disabled / malicious, and perhaps three inputs disabled / malicious - with special attention paid to likely cascading failures. Anything the automated system can't deal with should (a) be detectable through sanity checks and (b) have a reliable human response that pilots are trained in.
My experience in flight is limited to some skydiving and flight simulators. What I know about stalling from lack of thrust in level flight is that the plane seems to pitch downwards and becomes relatively unresponsive to the small adjustments in the elevators that ought to correct this pitch. A stupidly simple feedback system that doesn't know about the impending stall would simply try to counteract the stall by pitching up further and further, until it ends up in a flat stall / spin. The problem being that stall warnings are based on wind speed, which in turn requires an instrument.