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Re:If You Can’t Break Crypto, Break the Client: Recovery of ... by endymi0n on Friday April 08, 2016 @11:33AM (#11455378)
Not just the messages - the key too. Just imagine the outcry from someone breaking his iPhone not being able to restore his messages because of the introduction of end-to-end.

That way, you don't even have to attack WhatsApp itself and they have all the plausible deniability they needed.

Re:If You Can’t Break Crypto, Break the Client: Recovery of ... by sneak on Friday April 08, 2016 @08:39PM (#11459267)
The cryptosystem in use by Signal and now WhatsApp does not work this way. It offers forward secrecy, where recovery of the long-term keys will not allow decryption of past intercepted encrypyed messages.
Re:If You Can’t Break Crypto, Break the Client: Recovery of ... by eeeeeeeeeeeee on Friday April 08, 2016 @08:49PM (#11459310)
Would love to see a source on this. Every time I restore an iOS device, I need to manually re-enter anything secret like passwords.
Re:If You Can’t Break Crypto, Break the Client: Recovery of ... by mtgx on Friday April 08, 2016 @01:22PM (#11456279)
Why would the key be backed up to iCloud? Do you have a source for this?
Re:If You Can’t Break Crypto, Break the Client: Recovery of ... by wyldfire on Friday April 08, 2016 @04:06PM (#11457494)
Does iOS have a way to designate parts of app data as secret/transient/do_not_back_up? I suspect not.

EDIT: It appears that I was incorrect.

Re:If You Can’t Break Crypto, Break the Client: Recovery of ... by ctz on Friday April 08, 2016 @04:28PM (#11457649)
Yes, the NSURLIsExcludedFromBackupKey file property.