News for hackers. Stuff that matters.
Re:If You Can’t Break Crypto, Break the Client: Recovery of ... by yalooze on Friday April 08, 2016 @11:00AM (#11455066)
I had a similar thought with WhatsApp's Signal announcement. I believe that on iOS, by default all WhatsApp messages are backed up to iCloud Drive. So that would seem to be an easier attack vector.
Re:If You Can’t Break Crypto, Break the Client: Recovery of ... by endymi0n on Friday April 08, 2016 @11:33AM (#11455378)
Not just the messages - the key too. Just imagine the outcry from someone breaking his iPhone not being able to restore his messages because of the introduction of end-to-end.

That way, you don't even have to attack WhatsApp itself and they have all the plausible deniability they needed.

Re:If You Can’t Break Crypto, Break the Client: Recovery of ... by sneak on Friday April 08, 2016 @08:39PM (#11459267)
The cryptosystem in use by Signal and now WhatsApp does not work this way. It offers forward secrecy, where recovery of the long-term keys will not allow decryption of past intercepted encrypyed messages.
Re:If You Can’t Break Crypto, Break the Client: Recovery of ... by eeeeeeeeeeeee on Friday April 08, 2016 @08:49PM (#11459310)
Would love to see a source on this. Every time I restore an iOS device, I need to manually re-enter anything secret like passwords.
Re:If You Can’t Break Crypto, Break the Client: Recovery of ... by mtgx on Friday April 08, 2016 @01:22PM (#11456279)
Why would the key be backed up to iCloud? Do you have a source for this?
Re:If You Can’t Break Crypto, Break the Client: Recovery of ... by wyldfire on Friday April 08, 2016 @04:06PM (#11457494)
Does iOS have a way to designate parts of app data as secret/transient/do_not_back_up? I suspect not.

EDIT: It appears that I was incorrect.

Re:If You Can’t Break Crypto, Break the Client: Recovery of ... by ctz on Friday April 08, 2016 @04:28PM (#11457649)
Yes, the NSURLIsExcludedFromBackupKey file property.
Re:If You Can’t Break Crypto, Break the Client: Recovery of ... by ikeboy on Friday April 08, 2016 @11:10AM (#11455167)
Re:If You Can’t Break Crypto, Break the Client: Recovery of ... by biokoda on Friday April 08, 2016 @01:38PM (#11456414)
The only text/voip app that securely stores its data is Biocoded (https://biocoded.com/home). Even if the local on-device database gets copied elsewhere, it will be undecryptable outside of that device.
Re:If You Can’t Break Crypto, Break the Client: Recovery of ... by tetrep on Friday April 08, 2016 @02:33PM (#11456821)
What's wrong with Signal's encrypted storage? AFAIK if you set a password it will be used to encrypt local storage of your messages.
Re:If You Can’t Break Crypto, Break the Client: Recovery of ... by biokoda on Friday April 08, 2016 @02:53PM (#11456952)
It's not that difficult to break. Anything encrypted with a password is not all that secure. Someone can clone your device or by using a security hole in the device can get to that storage blob and eventually crack it in reasonable time.
Re:If You Can’t Break Crypto, Break the Client: Recovery of ... by caf on Friday April 08, 2016 @08:17PM (#11459168)
That entirely depends on how much entropy is in your passphrase. It's entirely possible to use one that cannot be cracked in reasonable time.
Re:If You Can’t Break Crypto, Break the Client: Recovery of ... by Natanael_L on Friday April 08, 2016 @03:42PM (#11457323)
Signal on Android offers password protected encryption for chat logs