Re:WhatsApp Rolls Out End-To-End Encryption to Its Over 1B U...
by tptacek on Friday April 08, 2016 @11:55AM
(#11455588)
What's incredible to me is that it's 2016 and people on one of the largest programming communities on the Internet are still acting like conventionally compiled iOS applications are impenetrable, but C source code for new cryptosystems is somehow instantly validated by the crowd.
It's like IDA Pro and OpenSSL never happened.
Re:WhatsApp Rolls Out End-To-End Encryption to Its Over 1B U...
by sp332 on Friday April 08, 2016 @11:56AM
(#11455601)
If you understand and verify the binary, you don't have to worry about what might happen to your messages on the company's servers.
[dead]
Re:WhatsApp Rolls Out End-To-End Encryption to Its Over 1B U...
by wglb on Friday April 08, 2016 @02:12PM
(#11456673)
This argument has appeared throughout this discussion, yet I know of approximately zero cases (validation/comfort through disassembly) of this happen.
I am curious where you looked for these cases that you saw none.
I assure you that this happens quite regularly. And what is wrong with IDA Pro? Why would it need to advance?
This notion that security products are vetted by analyzing the binary code is absurd yet it happens on a regular basis.
Re:WhatsApp Rolls Out End-To-End Encryption to Its Over 1B U...
by sp332 on Friday April 08, 2016 @12:32PM
(#11455931)
It has been dramatically progressing, but you'd have to look around yourself to know if it's beyond what you're thinking of.
Re:WhatsApp Rolls Out End-To-End Encryption to Its Over 1B U...
by tptacek on Friday April 08, 2016 @01:24PM
(#11456289)
You posted your "edit" about 20 minutes after 'sp332 correctly answered your question, and your edit is both flagrantly incorrect and rude.
[dead]
It really is incredible to see tptacek discounting the closed source, completely unaudited nature of this product. A company is saying "we have total end-to-end encryption...trust us", and to believe that you trust the binary that is on your device, that it is managing keys properly (there is usually a fine line between usability and security, and usability usually wins), and you trust that they don't misuse your messages when they pass through their server. They control every aspect of the conversation, and are fully capable of completely undermining your security at any moment (if not already). In practice it's not terribly unlike the widely discredited JavaScript encryption approaches.