(Or at least that's how it used to be.)
I agree, but I don't see how that's relevent. This could be added to pgp, without "adopting a new, unverified cryptosystem"
Sometimes you want plausible deniability, sometimes you want to sign something for all the world to be able to verify.
1: security against targeted surveillance from criminals or state-level adversaries. (= spying targets).
2: security against mass surveillance. (= finding targets)
I think it's possible to have Tier 2 system that is Tier 1 against mass surveillance. Individual connections don't have to be proofed against state level actor targeting individuals. It's enough that the whole system works in a way that makes mass surveillance too expensive.
In fact, I think this kind of security is enough to ease most concerns against government surveillance.
Tier 1: potentially inconvenient but maximally secure, in an OPSEC sense (PGP, for instance, though I would personally put Signal here too). Use carefully for security against state-level adversaries.
Tier 2: convenient mainstream applications with strong security but some tradeoffs. Your default choice, security against criminal adversaries. I'd put WhatsApp and iMessage here (but not many others).
Tier 3: unencrypted or dubiously encrypted mainstream applications, unsafe against any adversary, but potentially useful as an endpoint to (cautiously) bootstrap communications. Google Talk and AIM would go here for me.