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Re:FBI agrees to unlock iPhone for Arkansas prosecutor by qb45 on Thursday March 31, 2016 @05:24AM (#11395936)
> How does the prosecution prove the plaintext came from defendants' devices?

You show the recovered key and plaintext and demonstrate that they match the ciphertext.

The chance that several gigabytes of encrypted data accidentally happen to decrypt with wrong key to a different several gigabytes of perfectly valid data is rather slim, which means that any key which produces valid data is the key you are looking for.

Re:FBI agrees to unlock iPhone for Arkansas prosecutor by nxzero on Thursday March 31, 2016 @06:04AM (#11396050)
Right, in some cases I've seen a party forced to deliver an encrypted version of evidence that in the future they maybe required to produce, since this in theory provides custody and non-repudiation if required. In fact, this maybe the future of evidence, all data is legally collected as encrypted, then accessible on demand.

[1] https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Non-repudiation

Re:FBI agrees to unlock iPhone for Arkansas prosecutor by OvidNaso on Thursday March 31, 2016 @09:23AM (#11396939)
Wasn't that the entire purpose and function (practically) of TrueCrypt's hidden volumes?
Re:FBI agrees to unlock iPhone for Arkansas prosecutor by pricechild on Thursday March 31, 2016 @10:39AM (#11397491)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rubberhose_%28file_system%29 is another interesting implementation of the idea.

"Deniable Encryption" is the term.