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Re:My Take on FBI's “Alternative” Method by mikeash on Tuesday March 22, 2016 @12:10PM (#11337565)
This could actually be a way to cause some havoc. Leave nothing useful on the phone, but dangle it in front of authorities, making them go crazy trying to get into it. I'm sure this guy was not that clever, though.

What you describe is essentially how Touch ID works on newer iPhones, just with your fingerprint as the simple passcode. On a fresh boot, you have to put in your full passphrase, and every 48 hours after that. After you put in your passphrase, fingerprint unlock is available until either you turn the phone off, 48 hours passes, or fingerprint authentication fails five times in a row.

Unfortunately, the 48 hours thing isn't configurable, so it's not quite perfect, but it's pretty decent.

Certainly for me, it has immensely improved the security of my phone. In situations where I don't trust the fingerprint authentication (e.g. crossing an international border), I can just shut the phone off. Otherwise, it provides "good enough" security. Yes, there are potential attacks on the system, by copying my fingerprints and replicating it, but the five-attempt limit and the 48-hour timeout are good enough. For me, it's a vast improvement over what came before, when I had a passcode of 0000 just to satisfy some apps that wouldn't offer certain features unless a passcode was set.

There are some improvements I'd like to see. The timeout should be customizable. I'd like to be able to set up a "duress fingerprint" which immediately disables fingerprint authentication, as an easier alternative to turning off the phone. But overall it seems like a good blend of security and usability.

Re:My Take on FBI's “Alternative” Method by xoa on Tuesday March 22, 2016 @02:45PM (#11338887)
>I'd like to be able to set up a "duress fingerprint" which immediately disables fingerprint authentication, as an easier alternative to turning off the phone.

Coercion codes would certainly be a great next step for Apple to implement, not just with fingerprints but with actual pass phrases/PINs as well. Ideally a coercion code system would allow a couple of different levels of response depending on a user's needs and the situation they faced. For example, one simple PIN/finger print could just revert the system to needing the full passphrase, while another (or a longer passphrase for that matter) could cause the machine to activate pre-scripted actions, wipe itself, or even simulate a malfunction.

For what it's worth you can actually already do a limited version of this under iOS if you jailbreak. Touch ID can handle up to five separate fingerprints, and in vanilla iOS AFAIK any successful read is the same as any other in terms of system action. Interestingly however, internally Apple actually registers a separate system event for each different finger. Either writing your own tool or using a tweak like Activator, you can thus set different fingers to trigger different actions, including shutting down/rebooting the device (which in turn activates a long pass phrase) or running a script (which allows alerts, photos, erasure, boot looping, or potentially even something proximate to bricking via messing with nvram).

I'm actually quite curious what, if anything, Apple plans to do with Touch ID in the future because they've clearly left themselves some flexibility in the underlying system that I don't think they're presently using anywhere in iOS. Maybe they're more leaning towards features like "select a different payment system with a different finger" or "unlock and launch straight into a favorite app with different fingers", or even some form of multiuser access based on different finger prints, but if Apple decided to start implementing features against rubber-hose cryptanalysis in iOS 10 it'd genuinely be pretty exciting. I'm not aware of any mainstream consumer electronics even attempting anything like that yet, though if anyone has some existing/historical examples I'd really love to read about them.

Re:My Take on FBI's “Alternative” Method by Johnny555 on Tuesday March 22, 2016 @12:22PM (#11337656)
Ahh interesting, I didn't realize that TouchID would also require a password periodically, I don't have much faith in fingerprint ID, but the required password helps.

I like your idea of the duress fingerprint since the police can demand that you supply a fingerprint to unlock a device (but can't demand a passphrase). If you use the wrong one then "Oops, I was so stressed out I forgot which fingerprint to use".

I really think it's unlikely that law enforcement will ever take an interest in my phone, yet I still like knowing that my data is my data.

Re:My Take on FBI's “Alternative” Method by shkkmo on Tuesday March 22, 2016 @01:10PM (#11338032)
> I like your idea of the duress fingerprint since the police can demand that you supply a fingerprint to unlock a device (but can't demand a passphrase).

There are cases where a judge can force you to supply a password.

https://www.eff.org/issues/know-your-rights#17

Re:My Take on FBI's “Alternative” Method by rietta on Tuesday March 22, 2016 @01:44PM (#11338369)
Dump a few hundred megabytes from /dev/random into an encrypted file with a provocative name. The thing every Cypherpunk dreams about.
Re:My Take on FBI's “Alternative” Method by katbyte on Tuesday March 22, 2016 @01:17PM (#11338111)
> I'd like to be able to set up a "duress fingerprint"

I personally just don't use the tip of my thumb, so unless you knew that I would just try it 5 times and lock out touch id.

Re:My Take on FBI's “Alternative” Method by knd775 on Tuesday March 22, 2016 @01:37PM (#11338301)
Unless the FBI goes through your HN history ;)
Re:My Take on FBI's “Alternative” Method by mikeash on Tuesday March 22, 2016 @02:26PM (#11338717)
This is just part of the subterfuge; it's actually a different finger he doesn't use.