Re:StartSSL domain validation vulnerability
by pfg on Monday March 21, 2016 @04:45PM
(#11331826)
Your solution is still vulnerable in cases where someone's able to control [email protected]. Admittedly, that's a bit far-fetched, but the correct solution would be to have an enumeration of allowed emails and only accept those (or, more generally: whitelist things).
It's amazing that their web component is even allowed to dictate what verification addresses are permittable. That should be the concern of a completely separate component of their infrastructure. Says a lot of about their security architecture, I guess.
Re:StartSSL domain validation vulnerability
by G3E9 on Monday March 21, 2016 @04:50PM
(#11331883)
Sorry, I made a bad implication that the backend would check to see if $MASTER_EMAIL was one of the three, as you called them, white-listed values ("postmaster", "hostmaster" or "webmaster") and if not then to stop processing the form.
It's amazing that their web component is even allowed to dictate what verification addresses are permittable. That should be the concern of a completely separate component of their infrastructure. Says a lot of about their security architecture, I guess.