News for hackers. Stuff that matters.
Re:StartSSL domain validation vulnerability by pfg on Monday March 21, 2016 @04:45PM (#11331826)
Your solution is still vulnerable in cases where someone's able to control [email protected]. Admittedly, that's a bit far-fetched, but the correct solution would be to have an enumeration of allowed emails and only accept those (or, more generally: whitelist things).

It's amazing that their web component is even allowed to dictate what verification addresses are permittable. That should be the concern of a completely separate component of their infrastructure. Says a lot of about their security architecture, I guess.

Re:StartSSL domain validation vulnerability by G3E9 on Monday March 21, 2016 @04:50PM (#11331883)
Sorry, I made a bad implication that the backend would check to see if $MASTER_EMAIL was one of the three, as you called them, white-listed values ("postmaster", "hostmaster" or "webmaster") and if not then to stop processing the form.