Re:Johns Hopkins researchers poke a hole in Apple’s encryption
by madeofpalk on Monday March 21, 2016 @08:52AM
(#11327687)
This is true for transit.
However once the message has been delivered onto the device, they're either stored in plaintext, or backed up in plaintext (with the backup itself being encrypted with a key Apple has)
In saying that... I'm now wondering why they aren't encrypting the messages using the passcode like other sensitive data. I guess so the backup can be restored onto another phone and have the messages persist.
Re:Johns Hopkins researchers poke a hole in Apple’s encryption
by rdl on Tuesday March 22, 2016 @08:11PM
(#11341016)
The problem is iCloud Backup -- it really should work in a way which doesn't give Apple unlimited access. Yet, allow restore onto new devices, without requiring users memorize long passwords, and without a bunch of confusing options or steps for most users.
It's a fairly hard problem to do very well. What they do today isn't particularly close to "very well", so even some easy improvements could make it a lot better.
Re:Johns Hopkins researchers poke a hole in Apple’s encryption
by Twisell on Wednesday March 23, 2016 @02:27AM
(#11342520)
This is plainly wrong the device is fully encrypted RTFM
https://www.apple.com/business/docs/iOS_Security_Guide.pdf
PS: But yeah the optional iCloud backup is currently the weak spot.
Is this different when iCloud is enabled?