You are typing your sensitive message right there in the browser, in the web page provided by them, with JavaScript provided by them, which can simply send whatever you type directly to their (compromised) server.
This means OpenPGP in the browser is technically feasible, but very insecure because a third party can access the data before it is encrypted. To make a browser provided OpenPGP API work, it would have to provide the input area where you type your confidential message in a way that makes it clear it is the browser that provides it, and the web page JavaScript cannot access it before encryption. This is of course exactly what stand-alone e-mail clients do, so why implement it in the browser?
While I completely agree that those commands are all that is needed most of the time, it's this part that unfortunately makes pgp/gpg so unpopular:
> command lines
Even on HN I find people that hate the command line (even though they use it). The problem is the complete lack of front ends wrappers around those commands in every other email tool.
The enigmail plugin for thunderbird is surprisingly nice. It even does a decent job at key management (including the web of trust), but it made the "80% of PGP's value" completely transparent. If you have the key for an address, emails are automagically piped through gpg, and it handles decryption for you similarly (with pgp-agent support for less passphrase typing). Of course, that was only useful for the handful of us that used thunderbird; with Mozilla dropping the project, it's questionable if this has a useful future.
Almost all of the complexity with pgp/gpg can be hidden behind a nice GUI and opportunistic[1] enabling of the crypto. Unfortunately development has been focused on walled gardens and tying people to artificial dependencies[2] instead of writing useful client-installed software.
[1] Fallback to plaintext that people use currently is necessary until a critical mass of keys have been shared.
[2] why write a client app when you can make it hard for people to switch to other services by tying them to your domain name? /sigh/
In reality, 80% of PGP's value (which is more value than you'll get out of any webmail system), you can get with three command lines:
Encrypt and sign a document, ASCII armored for inclusion in a 7-bit email, to a specific person or persons Dump your public key for out-of-band transmission to the peer you're exchanging messages with Decrypt a message sent to you by someone else.No keyservers. No subkeys. No crazy formatting. No exotic key types. Send a message to someone, read a message back from them.
You don't get forward secrecy (unless you manually rotate keys). You don't get peer validation unless you do it manually. You don't get real time chat. You can't encrypt a videoconference. On the other hand: you won't be the subject of someone's amusing blog post a year from now, either, because PGP used this way has been reliable for something like 15 years running.
Everyone I know who actually uses PGP, like for real, more than a couple times a year, uses it pretty much this way.