Given trust in the protection of the private key used to sign the hash list file the integrity of the executable content can be proved (assuming useful SHA1 collision creation is prohibitively expensive).
Coincidentally I was writing a Bash script this weekend to auto-install (Ubuntu) releases into LVM volumes and it includes the following code to verify the download:
set -e
# ...
ISO="${NEW_DIST}-desktop-${ARCH}.iso"
for F in SHA1SUMS SHA1SUMS.gpg ${ISO}; do
if [ ! -r $F ]; then
wget http://cdimage.ubuntu.com/${FLAVOUR}/daily-live/current/$F
fi
done
if ! gpg --verify --keyring /etc/apt/trusted.gpg SHA1SUMS.gpg SHA1SUMS; then
echo "Error: failed to verify the hash file list signature; files may have been tampered with"
exit 2
fi
if ! grep ${ISO} SHA1SUMS | sha1sum -c; then
echo "${ISO} is corrupted; please try again"
exit 1
fiDoesn't seem like a horrible idea to me: you could just add the developer's key to your client, have your client broadcast interest, receive a _signed_ list of available software with appropriate magnet info... Download servers could serve as initial trackers until enough information has propagated through the network for downloads to be trackerless. Checksums? Guaranteed. Signatures? Acquired. Checking? Performed automagically.
Granted, this just moves the point of failure to the developer's key. (Key acquisition needn't necessarily take place on the developer's site, a friend in the network could pass you a link containing the dev's key and the application's magnet info.)
It's not idiotic at all. You let anyone who wants to spread the load by providing downloads, but you use checksums - behind https - to ensure they can be trusted.
"By default". Most developers don't bother to register, and lots of people change the default (and after that, they can right click to open the app and bypass the warning).
I have to admit that Windows' UAC is better in that regard, as it shows the signees name. But of course this is only useful if you know the "right" name.
[0] http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/03/new-os-x-...
(There is third party tool named RB App Checker which does make these tasks a bit easier, though)
――――――
¹ — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Installer_(OS_X)
² — http://f.cl.ly/items/1s1E3n19273M1l3i3S2X/developer_id_insta...
“The two KeRanger infected Transmission installers were signed with a legitimate certificate issued by Apple. The developer ID in this certificate is “POLISAN BOYA SANAYI VE TICARET ANONIM SIRKETI (Z7276PX673)”, which was different from the developer ID used to sign previous versions of the Transmission installer. In the code signing information, we found that these installers were generated and signed on the morning of March 4.”
From: http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/03/new-os-x-...
and that didn't ring any alarm bells?
“And according to the analysis, this is exactly what they did. They used a different cert to sign their malware. I have to admit that Windows' UAC is better in that regard, as it shows the signees name. But of course this is only useful if you know the "right" name.”
“Yeah, I think this is a major issue on OS X. For the average user it is impossible to tell who signed an app, if it is sandboxed, and what permissions it has. Hell, using the codesign command to extract entitlements from all binaries in a package is hard even for advanced users... (There is third party tool named RB App Checker which does make these tasks a bit easier, though)”
…in this comment thread: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=11234966
[0]: https://forum.transmissionbt.com/viewtopic.php?f=4&t=17835
Many people would uninstall and download it over again when running into that kind of error message.
https adds a performance hit. The security of "checksum over https and actual file over http", if the checksum is checked, is the same as "actual file over https", barring preimage attacks.
HTTPS will ensure integrity of your download automatically with no action required from the user.
Checksums require the user to perform the integrity check manually, and 99.9% of users wont bother.
Please don't put your users at risk just to save a negligibly small number of CPU cycles.
> just to save a negligibly small number of CPU cycles
The link above says they can't afford the additional cost. If it's so negligible, would you sponder the cost of those extra cycles? I'm sure they would host on SSL if someone covered the cost.
> On our production frontend machines, SSL/TLS accounts for less than 1% of the CPU load, less than 10KB of memory per connection and less than 2% of network overhead. Many people believe that SSL takes a lot of CPU time and we hope the above numbers (public for the first time) will help to dispel that. [0]
[0]: https://www.imperialviolet.org/2010/06/25/overclocking-ssl.h...
https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Download_Security
>Practically it is difficult to provide SSL protected downloads at all. Many important software projects can only be downloaded in the clear, such as Ubuntu, Debian, Tails, Qubes OS, etc. This is because someone has to pay the bill and SSL (encryption) makes it more expensive. At the moment we don't have any mirror supporting SSL. We're looking for SSL supported mirrors to share the load.
Is it not true that mirrors supporting SSL are more expensive?
"On our production frontend machines, SSL/TLS accounts for less than 1% of the CPU load, less than 10 KB of memory per connection and less than 2% of network overhead. Many people believe that SSL/TLS takes a lot of CPU time and we hope the preceding numbers will help to dispel that." - Adam Langley, Google
Getting an SSL certificate used to be a cost, but that's taken care of now by https://letsencrypt.org/.
There are multiple named projects there that aren't using SSL, and I don't think it's just laziness. If you know of a way for them to use SSL mirrors for no additional cost, I'll work on getting them to switch over.
I suspect that wiki page you linked might be out of date. It seems like all of the Whonix download links on their website are over https, like the VirtualBox images https://www.whonix.org/download/12.0.0.3.2/Whonix-Workstatio....
Whonix also runs a tor mirror, which has significantly more overhead than TLS.
For tails: https://tails.thecthulhu.com/. It appears to be the same server behind http://dl.amnesia.boum.org/ based on the TLS cert.
The situation is messy to actually use https for all of these projects, but I think the issue now is organization rather than overhead.
I seem to remember downloading whonix from their site over HTTP around a year ago.
Do you see a tails HTTPS mirror?
Barring a situation where a CDN hosting the download is compromised but the main site is not hosted on the CDN, it's extremely unlikely that someone would have the ability to inject malware into the download and not have the ability to make the checksum match. Posting checksums is actually pretty useless, and was something that used to be used to deal with the possibility of malicious mirrors, but doesn't provide any security against mitm attacks (unless the main site is secure but the downloads aren't which is idiotic by 2016 standards anyway), the site getting hacked, etc.
Digital signatures are a little bit better if the key is kept safe, since hacking the site and replacing the binary won't allow a random person to produce a valid signature, although ability to modify the source code would still allow someone to introduce backdoors into the next version, but there's still a huge problem where you need some way to determine what key was supposed to be used to sign the binary in the first place, so just posting a signature on a website is also basically useless.
Digital signatures can work if there's some sort of centralized distribution method, or for safely updating software that's already installed.