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Re:The Linux Security Circus: On GUI Isolation (2011) by marcosdumay on Saturday March 05, 2016 @11:41AM (#11229954)
There ought to be a system level API that a program may call to get to read or write a user supplied file.

Opening any random file should be reserved to just a few core applications.

Re:The Linux Security Circus: On GUI Isolation (2011) by zanny on Saturday March 05, 2016 @01:35PM (#11230389)
Its called Mandatory Access Control. It has existed for over a decade in the mainline kernel. Ubutnu, Fedora, Suse - everyone but Arch, pretty much - supports one of its implementations.

The problem is more that I do not believe any distro is shipping a default-deny policy. Unknown programs are simply given the kitchen sink rather than having, say, user friendly prompts saying "this program has no access control and wants to open X or use Y, allow?"

But we definitely have the technology, and it does not take any heavy overhead isolation to do it.

Re:The Linux Security Circus: On GUI Isolation (2011) by noinsight on Saturday March 05, 2016 @03:01PM (#11230790)
> everyone but Arch

Arch has a grsec kernel in the repos if you want one...

Re:The Linux Security Circus: On GUI Isolation (2011) by zanny on Saturday March 05, 2016 @05:18PM (#11231344)
And nobody maintains prebaked PaX profiles for Arch, which makes the MAC part much less effective as a security feature.

There are two ways to do MAC - applications (or the distro) provides the profiles, that restrict execution to just what the program will use, and if it ever asks for anything else it should be suspect for exploitation. The other one is where you put your programs in learning mode, and that only hardens you against future exploits, not current ones, and you also lose the protection against untrusted software because by default everything is untrusted and you must trust everything on a case by case basis.

Re:The Linux Security Circus: On GUI Isolation (2011) by drdaeman on Saturday March 05, 2016 @12:12PM (#11230050)
It's not that simple, and it's easy to misdesign such API.

Say, VLC team had argued that a video player may need to open a supplementary subtitle file. If application can be only granted access to a single video file - that's impossible. I think there were other examples, but I don't remember those off-hand.

Re:The Linux Security Circus: On GUI Isolation (2011) by nine_k on Saturday March 05, 2016 @01:15PM (#11230280)
Filesystems are trees. VOX could have read access to a particular tree (~/Videos) and no access to everything else, including but not limited to ~/Documents/Finance
Re:The Linux Security Circus: On GUI Isolation (2011) by drdaeman on Saturday March 05, 2016 @08:19PM (#11232013)
But what if I want to watch ~/Downloads/big_buck_bunny.mkv?
Re:The Linux Security Circus: On GUI Isolation (2011) by nine_k on Sunday March 06, 2016 @01:51PM (#11234933)
Explicitly mark it as available by moving / hardlinking it to ~/Videos.
Re:The Linux Security Circus: On GUI Isolation (2011) by marcosdumay on Saturday March 05, 2016 @04:24PM (#11231157)
It's certainly not simple. This is a big UX problem, but one worth solving.
Re:The Linux Security Circus: On GUI Isolation (2011) by misterdata on Saturday March 05, 2016 @04:20PM (#11231138)
This is actually how it is implemented in OSX. If a sandboxed app shows a 'file open' panel then it automatically obtains the rights to read and write to any file selected (the open panel, or 'powerbox' as it is called, is implemented in a separate process so cannot be manipulated by the app). An app can also request a secure 'bookmark' to this file so it can persist file references.