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Re:ECDSA Key Extraction from Mobile Devices via Nonintrusive... by smartbit on Friday March 04, 2016 @08:43AM (#11223616)
Side-Channel attacks are nasty. Wonder why the FBI wasn't able to use this to hack the San Bernardino iPhone 5C, the NSA must be aware of this? From the article

In the sequel, unless stated otherwise, the experiments were performed on Apple iPhone 3GS which exhibited a particularly clear signal.

Hope Apple fixes this in future models, even when opened.

Re:ECDSA Key Extraction from Mobile Devices via Nonintrusive... by 05 on Friday March 04, 2016 @09:32AM (#11223903)
San Bernardino 5C could be cracked in two days using a NAND flash write blocker. You only need to program an FPGA to buffer writes to NAND chips in RAM instead of passing them through and to allow the reads, then you just try N PIN codes and reboot while resetting the blocker state cache. N is 4 if they haven't tried any PINs and 1 if there are delays after each because they've tried a couple PINs already. Phone boot time is ~1 minute, T(10000) = 10000 minutes / N (= a week if N==1)
Re:ECDSA Key Extraction from Mobile Devices via Nonintrusive... by 13of40 on Friday March 04, 2016 @10:04AM (#11224146)
Do you have a good citation for that or is it just a personal theory?
Re:ECDSA Key Extraction from Mobile Devices via Nonintrusive... by mikeash on Friday March 04, 2016 @10:10AM (#11224196)
Apple used to have a bug where they'd report PIN failure before writing that failure to nonvolatile storage. Somebody took advantage of this by building a box that cut power before the write could be performed, allowing a brute force attack:

https://www.intego.com/mac-security-blog/iphone-pin-pass-cod...

The proposal here is similar, just using a different technique to prevent the write.

There isn't any nonvolatile storage besides the flash memory, so if you can reset that then the software has no way of knowing what happened before.

Re:ECDSA Key Extraction from Mobile Devices via Nonintrusive... by superuser2 on Friday March 04, 2016 @01:15PM (#11225687)
Note that this was patched and is no longer feasible.
Re:ECDSA Key Extraction from Mobile Devices via Nonintrusive... by dr_zoidberg on Friday March 04, 2016 @11:59AM (#11225034)
Thanks for the link, it looks interesting.
Re:ECDSA Key Extraction from Mobile Devices via Nonintrusive... by 05 on Friday March 04, 2016 @11:25AM (#11224793)
A personal theory. The iPhone Wiki has a description of iPhone storage structure - it seems newer phones (pre Secure Enclave) don't have separate NOR, NVRAM and NAND - they just use NAND for everything. [1] https://www.theiphonewiki.com/wiki/NOR
Re:ECDSA Key Extraction from Mobile Devices via Nonintrusive... by tptacek on Friday March 04, 2016 @11:22AM (#11224771)
How would that attack work? The key isn't resident; it's derived in part from the passcode. The target can't do any useful work with the key that could leak through side channels, because it doesn't have the key.
Re:ECDSA Key Extraction from Mobile Devices via Nonintrusive... by karlytypes on Friday March 04, 2016 @08:55AM (#11223672)
iOS 9, which apparently isn't vulnerable to this, was released 3 months prior to the San Bernardino attack. Furthermore, is a locked phone just sitting there performing time-dependent ECDSA signing operations all day long?