One could argue that the CA/Browser forum has achieved some success with moving away from SHA-1. As a spectator, I don't understand why this process is not repeated for similar obsolete primitives or standards.
Only solution I can think of is to create some sort of license where once the sunset deadline is established, the license to use it expires hard on the deadline.
If (as a random example that didn't annoy me at all for 2 years) a website also needs to support SmartTV devices which only accept obsolete certificates then your server has to either break them or not.
Obviously upgrading old clients is hard, but that's going to be a problem regardless. So in new standards that need RSA (e.g. something where the private key needs to be able to encrypt and sign), push for OEAP. If they don't need RSA, push for modern curves.
(There are attacks against OAEP, but they're less common and not intrinsic to the design the way PKCS1v15's are).
My impression is that RSA never really got the "djb treatment". The people designing OAEP and friends were mostly theorists concerned with security reductions, not implementation issues. I think an idiot-proof RSA scheme could be devised, but it is now way too late for that.
Moreover, if we can't get rid of export ciphersuites after twenty years, what is the probability that we'll manage to get rid of RSA in just a few? I'm not that optimistic.
There would be very little problem with RSA in TLS if people had moved to modern schemes like OAEP and RSA-PSS. The problem is that we didn't, and we're stuck with obsolete crap. Moving away from obsolete crap isn't the solution, it's the definition of the problem.