Re:Answers to your questions about Apple and security
by jonpaine on Monday February 22, 2016 @02:29PM
(#11153550)
VERY interesting. Thanks for posting. I wasn't familiar with CALEA.
For clarity, a CALEA type approach wouldn't compel a company to ACTIVELY subvert their own systems (as in Apple creating new tools for the Gov't to achieve that end under All Writs).
Instead, CALEA would force companies to create LESS secure systems from the start which could then be subverted passively (no All Writs component) on request to allow for "lawful intercept". Is that a fair characterization?
But in sum, a legal argument based on CALEA. Makes sense. Thanks-
Re:Answers to your questions about Apple and security
by tajen on Monday February 22, 2016 @04:28PM
(#11154428)
The whole point of NSLs is to have the same level as CALEA, but not publicly. Apple is requiring the FBI to lay down its cards and submit them to public examination, rather than act in secret, which is a progress for democracy in US.
I say US, because I don't see any mention of foreign countries about either the iPhone 5 or the Secure Enclave. Apple is probably legally required to spy on foreign nationals, isn't it?
This seems, to me, to be similar to CALEA[1] requirements that compel telco companies to implement infrastructure that allows wiretapping. I do not have firsthand experience, but on the face of it telcos are specifically forbidden under CALEA to implement devices or technology in their infrastructure that could prevent "lawful intercept" from occurring. This particular instance does not seem to have a CALEA justification, but that may be a temporary problem.
I think that they are setting themselves up for a win/win scenario and may not be concerned with the legal footing being ironclad. If they win, great. Otherwise, fighting for and losing this case is the stepping stone to going to congress to get a CALEA analog for US companies making communications devices.
[1]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Communications_Assistance_for_...