> Technology failures. The American strategy for air superiority, not just with the F-35 but also with the F-22 and other modern aircraft, is based on two fundamental technologies. The first is “stealth“: using technology to help our planes to evade detection by radar. The second is “BVR”: using long-range missiles to shoot down enemy planes before the pilot can ever even see them. (The acronym stands for “beyond visual range.“) These technologies are the key to the plan for how a smaller, more high-tech force like ours can defeat a more numerous but lower-tech one like China’s.
This also holds true for China and BVR strikes against US naval assets [particular Aircraft Carriers] are critical to China's ability to actually invade Taiwan.
The truth is we simply don't know what the real outcome of a battle/war would be but things like the OP are pretty much useless unless China can hit us BVR because they are slow enough BVR strikes against them would be viable.
US's BVR problem for is it is really limited to aircraft and they need to be able to stop China in the air/water because a protracted land war is untenable.
China's BVR problem is the fact they can't stop us throwing as many missiles as we can afford/manufacture at them while maintaining a supply line.
I know which problem I'd rather have and it sure as hell isn't supplying an invasion force while my opponent can throw effectively unlimited missiles from BVR at me. Sure, I might be able to stop 80% of them but the US can build basically unlimited quantities of them in a serious war.
I'm not sure a U.S./Chinese war that came down to raw industrial production capacity would be as favorable a scenario for the U.S. in (say) 2020 as it would have been in 1990...
They are substantially cheaper than even China can build amphibious transport ships for, let alone the munitions & troops they'd carry.
Even China's manufacturing capacity isn't enough to handle the massive cost difference of a transport vs. sinking it.
One thing I've seen is that many government projects get their budget shrunk if they don't spend it all... So they use their entire budget even if they don't need to. That is only one small problem in a hugely broken system. A system that doesn't strive for their goal of "winning wars with minimal cost of life."
The sad thing is, most people don't seem to care. I even tried to discuss it with the Minister for Development (I'm in Germany) at some point, since I've been working in a place within his influence and saw people do ridiculous things with money near the end of the year, but he didn't even try to understand what I was talking about (he half-heartedly tried to get some names out of me though). Maybe he was too drunk, I hope he was.
(Then again, that particular place I worked at measures their progress towards goals in money spent, and that is what the bosses fret over.)
Maybe one of the reasons is that the government tries to stimulate the economy and thus keeps up the spending. Still, talking about austerity at the same time is a mismatch. I'm still trying to figure out this puzzle.
Does anyone here have any clues to the situation? Is there a good reason for this rule to exist?
Something I remembered while reading this, is that Philippines is thawing a bit to the idea of the presence of USA war matériel. There aren't any bases open yet, and Subic Bay would still be 500 nm away from Taiwan, but if China continues as they have, a number of new opportunities might come up.
Fuck 'em. We had a big air base and a big naval base in the Philippines, and they kicked us out.
But, as Henry Kissinger frequently reminded us, we don't have friends or allies, we have "interests". And I'll grant you, right now it is very much in the US's "interest" to have an expanded presence in the area.
While the F-35 does rely entirely on stealth, the ATF program that gave birth to the F-22 emphasized both stealth and extreme performance. High speed and high altitude complement stealth by reducing the adversary's reaction time while increasing the reach of one's own weapons.
Do you have anymore about the RAF's cold-war Harrier plans?
The chapter titled "The Cold War Concepts of Operation for the RAF Harrier Force" (p. 55-63), written by Group Captain Jock Heron, will be of particular interest.