Civil Forefeiture has been a problem for a long time.
It's not that it's bad if it's this case. It's that is bad if it applies as a built-in backdoor for whenever they feel like using it.
I am positive banks can open those things, and vehicles are inherently "openable", so I do not quite get the point here.
Because the "master key" alluded to in the letter is ethereal and can be duplicated (as opposed to handed over). This means:
- Since the key can be duplicated, there is no serious way to ensure that only the police (or any other legally entitled organ) can do the search. Anyone who can get it will have police-level access to anything and will be able to offer police-level access to anyone. The "anyone" in question can be a former policeman who hates life, some script kiddie, the Chinese and so on -- and neither of these people are likely to care much about the "due legal process".
- The police can trivially search it without the owner's knowledge and without leaving evidence. The high costs in time and money are a reasonable deterrent for searching property, vehicles etc. without the due legal process. For an electronic device, that cost is practically zero.
Regarding the first point -- for what it's worth, a while ago, army regulations here required that all doors have a physical lock and key, even if they also had an access code, for precisely this reason. The access code or the card swiping were used to log access (i.e. everyone had their own card, access codes could be logged so that you at least knew when someone was entering etc.) but when a door was supposed to be locked for good (e.g. labs not in use during the night), they were locked with real keys and sealed with old-fashioned wax seals. The rationale was that breaking the lock required quite a little time (and maybe even some door banging), increasing the chances that someone who tried to break in would be discovered, and physical evidence of a break-in was fairly hard to erase, as opposed to a purely electronic break-in which was quick to do (just enter the code). I don't know if this is true anymore, nor how common it was outside this part of the world, but it makes some sense.
That seems a lot different from getting a search warrant and having the right to go through your belongings.
I agree that due process should compel Apple to unlock if they have the capabilities to. But no subpoena can beat math, right?
EDIT: I just realised that what the FBI is talking about is a backdoored version of iOS. To me the compromise seems to be writing the backdoored version but leaving it in Apple's hands (so Apple could send the FBI the data but not send them the OS). The only problem with that, of course, is that such a backdoored version could then be taken by a judge.
Honestly, it seems like the judge could force Apple to hand over the OS update signing keys to the FBI...
Because it is possible to create a smartphone that is impossible to break into. The others it is impossible to create one that is impossible to break
Or maybe you think it's OK to do it just this once?
Sort of the "just the tip" mentality here?
The problem is that once such a capability is added to the OS, there is no going back. And it can then be used with or without your wonderful US due legal process, potentially by criminals and definitely by governments in countries where human and civil rights are a joke.
As much as I value privacy I really don't agree with Apple's stance here - if due legal process has been followed, why shouldn't they be able to read the contents of an iPhone ?
And yes I get that third party encryption can be used, which isn't owned by Apple and that there's little the authorities could do about it - but that's not the case at hand here.