Also, at 1.5% equity and no effective shares till that valuation threshold, we don't have enough equity to force companies to do anything they don't want. That's also part of our philosophy anyway.
True. That's why I said you guys can handle it. ;)
Anyway, my gut suggests that pressure cooking a company to go public or raise a big round for the sake of a possibility of $1.5 million probably isn't highly ranked among the ways YC can direct effort for return on capital. That YC won't have a stake in a $50 million dollar acquisition may indicate how pennies and nickels are seen by YC.
If they just put the cash up for people to work on interesting things and it helps grow the YC network and feed some interesting companies into the YC Core program, then it's probably worth it without any equity compensation.
But that model wouldn't look so great if the next Google comes out of the program but doesn't do the YC Core program, resulting in a massive outcome that YC doesn't get to participate in.
This model supports the former and protects against the latter, in a way that seems really founder-friendly to me. Founders could take the money and build a small business, go to YC Core, give up altogether, or leave the YC ecosystem and build a massive company – and regardless which path they take, this capital won't cost them anything unless they build something massive.
In my experience that happens very rarely. If the board votes at all, and especially if in a direction that the CEO doesn't want to go, then it's usually a vote to dismiss the CEO.
But the people you surround yourself with (and their incentives) do matter. "Control" is a lot more subtle and social than you might expect.
In that sense, we are saying the same thing. I agree that "control" does not require voting by the board. I do assert that investors with board seats exert far more control that those without, and investors with higher equity positions exert more control than those with less. I also assert that an equity stake of 1.5% exerts very little control. Again, YC exerts _influence_ (call it control if you want) simply because of their reputation for being good at what they do, but 1.5% ownership barely changes that equation.
Is it (founder friendly)? It places YC (even more) firmly on the VC side of the classic VC/founder conflict: VCs want founders to go big or go home, or as pg puts it "VCs want to blow you up, in one sense of the phrase or the other." [1] Not that I don't think YC can handle it, but still.
1. http://paulgraham.com/aord.html