Don't get this wrong please: this is still probably THE best solution right now, which simply as well has its security limitations, right?
Is there any work ongoing on a kind of "verification process" for Apps like these? How can an end-user tell if the binaries running on their device are untempered with?
/sorry for hijacking ;)
(Also: I think this question is mostly independent from the disagreements between moxie and f-droid - they were regarding other issues.)
We control the whole packaging/signing framework (WebSign), so there isn't any need for us to wait on a third party to roll this out.
Is it a problem with C/C++ in particular, where toolchains are complex? Or would non-reproducible also be a problem e.g for a Java library?
Googling reproducible builds mainly gets you Debian info, not a general description of the issue
For example:
- compiler version used
- date / timestamps at the time of compile
- build id's
A good article on this can be found here:
https://blogs.kde.org/2013/06/19/really-source-code-softwareHowever, the NEWER versions of Signal requires access to your contact to work.
For many users that is a show stopper.
Implement a way for user to search by User ID and allow user to find each other by ID in addition to phone number.
I realize that phone numbers are probably hashed before being sent, with only local contact data being displayed, but it has people concerned nonetheless. It starts to err more towards convenience, ease of use, and network building above security.
Ricochet uses Tor hidden services to anonymise your social graph, which is something you don't do with Signal (not to mention that Signal does identity key lookups with phone numbers). I'm not sure there's a low-latency way to do VOIP anonymously. The best method I know of is to literally record and send audio files, which have a few seconds of latency.
A well-designed encrypted chat-protocol should work on any modern networked computing device, not just smartphones or computing devices linked to a smartphone.
Tried just now. It does require it and doesn't work without it.
Sorry!
Signal requires access to your
contacts. We do not store your
contacts on our servers.
[Give access]If there isn't a good answer to key management, or my key is handled by JS, then it's a no-go for me.
If there is a half-way decent answer to key management, I ask what the threat vectors the system was designed for are. If a broad political statement is made, then I walk away.
While it doesn't actually vet the technical merit of the code, I feel it catches a lot of funniness.
The problem with key management is that everyone tries to solve the management problem with a single solution. A single method will always have to make choices about the threat model, which can only truly be known by the user. A single user can even have more than one threat model, depending on what they are doing.
What we need instead is some sort of configurable layer that allows the user to specify how keys should be managed by selecting what they want to trust.
They could use a default delegation to a public trust root (the PKI model, no configuration needed) for most things. Receiving a call from the bank could instead be authenticated with the key they got when they physically walked into the local branch. Chat with their immediate friends who can exchange keys on their phone when they meet up in person is easy, and a web of trust can extend that to a friend-of-a-friend. People understand the concept of vouching for someone, and over time more than one method can be used to cross-check.
Key management shouldn't be "PKI vs web-of-trust vs out-of-band-keybase-style vs manual-key-exchange vs ..."; it should be "all of the above, with the chain-of-trust exposed". Anything else is making assumptions about what the user's current needs.
I use Signal right now (from Moxie Marlinspike/Whisper Systems) and would only really consider alternatives if they were endorsed by other cryptographers I know because I really just don't have a strong enough grasp of how all the machinery interacts.