Read more here: https://fdroid.eutopia.cz/
> If we were going to rank our priorities, they would be in this order:
> 1) Make mass surveillance impossible.
> 2) Stop targeted attacks against crypto nerds.
As long as US Army is not using metadata to shoot people with hellfire missiles on American soil, Signal is good enough for general population.
If you want perfect protocol - work on Vuvuzela. But good luck porting traffic analysis resistant solution to mobile phones with their limited battery capacity.
What do you know, general population of the world does not live on American soil.
I can't trust Moxie after he called Google, Microsoft and Apple having absolute control over people's good thing, and called people having control over their own devices "going back to the old broken desktop security model".
Can you trust someone like that? It all makes me think that Signal is some kind of honeypot.
When speaking about non-technical, generally-clueless-about-computers people? This is ABSOLUTELY the correct attitude to have. Being able to trick someone into installing softare that reports back everything you do on your computer by getting the user to Punch The Monkey is a BUG, not a feature. The screaming hellpit that is the state of PC security is very bad for the average computer user.
For technical users, systems (like Secure Boot, along with a chain of bootloader/kernel/userspace software verifiers [0]) that let you -say- securely attest that you trust an alternative source of software are really good, when implemented properly. They help prevent drive-by malware installation, as well as let you know when your machine has been tampered with. This is a GOOD property to have.
What about users who want to run their homebrew software (or even start to learn how to code), but don't want to be bothered with code signing key enrollment? On the one hand, I guess -in this world- they're left out in the cold, if they're not doing something in the browser. On the other hand, any programmer is going to quickly face challenges far greater than any non-pathologically-bad key enrollment mechanisms... if the would-be non-web-programmer never gets over this hurdle, it's very likely (in its absence) he would have been stopped by any of the other couple-hundred difficult things along the way.
[0] It's late, so some of these verifiers (particularly the userspace one) might not exist in any mainstream distro.
...
Now, when you've suddenly realized that people:
1) will not stop using mobile phones
2) mobile phones are tracking devices
3) preventing mobiles from tracking you is well beyond skills of both average tech person and average joe
4) average person is not capable of keeping malware away from their machine
What do you propose? Can you do better than moxie? Or will you continue to spread FUD about best available tech?
Not American soil... but... NSA 'drone strikes based on mobile phone data'
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/politics/nsa-drone-s...
Hmmm...
I wonder why they don't link the tweets?
Except:
(Feb 2013) "So that's where we are. I believe that the decision not to distribute prebuilt APKs achieves the following balance:
1) It does not encourage the average user to tick "allow 3rd party APKs" in Android settings.
2) It allows "power" users who can appropriately manage the risks to install TextSecure without Play by building from source.
The thesis essentially being, if you aren't able to build TextSecure from source, you probably aren't capable of managing the risks associated with 3rd party sources." [0]
and
(Jul 2013) "Hey @rickbarton , to my knowledge we have not forbidden anything. People have requested that we distribute official binary APKs outside of the Play Store, which we are currently choosing not to do for several reasons (#127, #281). If we can address those issues we would be happy to distribute binary APKs.
However, this does not "forbid" anyone else from doing whatever they please. ..." [1]
Other things:
* The author neither links to nor provides screenshots of, nor quotes from the Twitter comments that he references. This is a bit of a red flag.
* The author asserts that "Moxie is not open to arguments and wants TextSecure to be distributed only via Google Play. He already locked this discussion.", which is plainly not true. If it was true, Issue #127 would be closed, and Moxie would not have made the comment that he did on issue #281. [2] It's also notable that the discussion lock didn't happen until 2015-01-09... a year and a half after the requirements for official distribution outside of Google Play were laid out in the comment attached to issue #281.
The fellow running the Eutopia.cz F-Droid repo clearly has an axe to grind, and is either unable to, or in too much of a hurry to understand the actual situation on the ground. When dealing with security software, you really, really want skilled, careful, meticulous people to be in charge of design, implementation, and packaging. This guy doesn't seem to be such a person.
[0] https://github.com/WhisperSystems/Signal-Android/issues/127#...
[1] https://github.com/WhisperSystems/Signal-Android/issues/282#...
[2] https://github.com/WhisperSystems/Signal-Android/issues/281#...
* Time of Tx to Signal server
* Rough message length
* Time of Tx of message from Signal server to recipient (assuming that they were listening on that path, too)
Is my understanding incorrect? Can a passive adversary inspect the data from a TextSecure/Signal client and determine more (or just the above) information from the data sent from the TS client to the TS server?
If the passive adversary has enough listening posts, it's totally possible for them to be reasonably certain that they probably got all three, unless some sufficiently clever stuff is happening either at the WS servers, or in Google's servers.
You are still exposed to Google/Apple, since it can easily combine your contact information with traffic information and with great deal of probability detect who was the recipient.
I still would take it over encrypted SMS, where this data is open to carriers and carriers are basically perma-owned by everyone.
1) Google can see Alice send message via Signal
2) Google can see Bob receive message via Signal
3) Google knows that Alice is in Bob's contacts, and Bob is in Alice's contacts
Those three pieces of data should be enough. I don't see why Google can't do time correlation of those messages. Both Alice's and Bob's contact lists are very finite. It might be not obvious for single message, but for series of messages (and people chat this way) it should be very obvious who is talking to whom.
You can use it on a WiFi only device. I currently have signal installed on a brand new iPod touch 6th Gen.
Its a device for using Signal messaging and phone calls only.
On a separate smart-phone, I entered the phone number, registered, waited for the phone call and then entered the verification code in the app.
I applied as much hardening as possible to the iPod and tether it either to my regular phone via WiFi or via a dedicated 4G modem i also have.
Easy and significantly safer (i think) as it mitigates base-band attack issues.
If you buy a temporary SIM, and that number is recycled, a new user can register it with Signal.
If that's the case, then you can register it to Signal on an iPod and not have to worry about base-band attacks on iPhone/Android devices. That's the point.
- Doesn't need access to Google Play
- Won't need Google Cloud Messaging (websockets instead)
I would really like these features to be supported in the official client. I don't understand why moxie doesn't reckon that these are legitimate concerns. Leaking metadata can be dangerous.
> Leaking metadata can be dangerous.
You should
* Read about how Signal's crypto works
* Remember that anyone can stand up a Signal server, and build a custom Signal client that will associate with the server that you stood up, rather than the official Signal servers.
But AFAIK moxie has some reservations about making it available via f-droid too.
If you didn't, please go back and read them, and the first ten or so comments of each bug I link to. The "reservations" about F-Droid have to do with its unsuitability for securely distributing software, and have nothing to do with a desire to prevent distribution of Signal through non-Google App Stores.
And while I understand moxie's concerns about fdroid, and I would like fdroid to fix these, I'm not sure if he is making the correct compromise. Getting access to Google Play throughout the regular route implies getting closed stuff from Google into your phone...
IIRC, getting access to software through the F-Droid marketplace explicitly required (at the time the big discussion was made (~3 years ago)) users to expose themselves to the risk that a compromise of F-Droid's online signing key (that -IIRC- wasn't even contained in an HSM(!)) would open them up to silent replacement of any and all software installed through F-Droid by the attacker. Note that "the attacker" could also be "anyone associated with F-Droid".
Despite what one might think about their for-profit datamining, Google has a really good track record with regards to the nitty-gritty of computer security.
When Moxie looked at what F-Droid provided, it was entirely inadequate to securely distribute software to TextSecure's target audience. Because TS/Signal is not currently officially distributed on the F-Droid market, I have to assume that it still cannot provide what is required to securely distribute Signal.
And, to top it all off, the F-Droid folks are so lazy that they write things like this:
"The latest version of the application is 0.6.2, and the security flaw has now been fixed. However, the author has not published any source code corresponding to the binary he released of this version, and far from wishing to help anyone stuck with his previous disastrous mistake, he actually asked for the application to be removed from our repository as he wants to distribute it via Google Play only." [0]
TS's source has been distributed via GitHub for ages. The version that the F-Droid guy says didn't have publicly available source at the time of his post appears to have been published for two weeks prior to his post. [1] If the guy who wrote that blog post is still in a position of responsibility at F-Droid, I don't trust the organization to pay sufficiently close attention to detail to package any security-critical software.
[0] https://f-droid.org/posts/security-notice-textsecure/
[1] https://github.com/WhisperSystems/Signal-Android/commit/f666... [2]
[2] And the initial import date on the GH repo jives with the date on the notice that TS had been released as OSS. [3]
[3] https://web.archive.org/web/20111225144326/http://www.whispe...
The decision to not allow exporting the key mitigates certain kind of attacks. I think the wording of the warning is appropriate and not that scary.
* It's not possible to use without a phone number. If you want to use it on a WiFi only device, you're out of luck.
* Which wouldn't be so bad, but there's no way to transfer between devices. You can't take an encrypted backup (on Android) and because you use their encryption keys, moving to another device means other Signal users get scary messages about not trusting you.
Minor problems & edge cases, sure - but still frustrating.