Given that this exploit happens during capability negotiation (or whatever SSH calls that part of the protocol), it also cannot be mitigated via pledge[2], which is where OpenBSD has been focusing a lot of attention. This is an unusual stumble for the OpenBSD team. Client-side privsep support, if such a thing existed, might mitigate attacks like this. As it stands protecting against exploits of this type wasn't even on the hardening roadmap.
http://www.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/man.cgi/OpenBSD-current/man2/...
Re:OpenSSH: client bug CVE-2016-0777
by icebraining on Thursday January 14, 2016 @12:08PM
(#10902659)
Related: "Protecting sshd using spiped" by cperciva
http://www.daemonology.net/blog/2012-08-30-protecting-sshd-u...
SCP/SFTP is actually a separate binary.
PuTTY is definitely not affected since it has its own SSH implementation.
PuTTY is completely different code.
Pretty sure this is OpenSSH only. PuTTY and SecureCRT, at least, are reported not to be affected.
We use WinSCP also, a file copying utility; it would be useful to know whether that's affected if anybody has that info.
Sounds like this was put in at one time, forgotten about, and the code lingered for a long time until someone pointed it out. SSH as a protocol is pretty crazy. Everyone loves it, but its a lot of things in one, which ironically goes against the unix philosophy. Its a remote terminal, a file transfer server, a network tunnel server, a socks server, etc. There's a lot of stuff in there and I imagine difficult to work with sometimes.
No word if this is enabled in Putty, but I imagine it is if its using openssh libraries.