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Re:OpenSSH: client bug CVE-2016-0777 by StefanKarpinski on Thursday January 14, 2016 @10:18AM (#10901860)
Does it strike anyone else as bizarre / poor form for an experimental feature to be enabled by default in OpenSSH, which is normally very conservative with option defaults?
Re:OpenSSH: client bug CVE-2016-0777 by agwa on Thursday January 14, 2016 @10:25AM (#10901903)
What's more, it was not documented in the ssh_config(5) man page. If it had been, I probably would have disabled it long ago when hardening my SSH config.

Time to head to the source to look for other undocumented options...

Update: my findings are here (scroll to bottom for the upshot): https://gist.github.com/AGWA/e92d4f5343be1f7a941d

UseRoaming is the only one to be concerned about. There are many other undocumented options, but they're all aliases for a documented option or are deprecated/unsupported.

Re:OpenSSH: client bug CVE-2016-0777 by ryanlol on Thursday January 14, 2016 @10:27AM (#10901921)
Re:OpenSSH: client bug CVE-2016-0777 by ryanlol on Thursday January 14, 2016 @10:39AM (#10902004)
Actually, I quickly generated a list of undocumented config options: http://sprunge.us/QDSE

Edit: Fixed version http://sprunge.us/LVYB

Re:OpenSSH: client bug CVE-2016-0777 by vesinisa on Thursday January 14, 2016 @10:52AM (#10902089)
most of those seem to be documented: http://www.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/man.cgi/OpenBSD-current/man5/...

I did a quick comparison between the OpCodes enum and the latest man page, and `UseRoaming` is the only real undocumented option.

Re:OpenSSH: client bug CVE-2016-0777 by ryanlol on Thursday January 14, 2016 @10:54AM (#10902103)
Weird, my manpages didn't get updated despite man claiming they did. Fixing that now.

Edit: fixed, http://sprunge.us/LVYB

Re:OpenSSH: client bug CVE-2016-0777 by jlgaddis on Thursday January 14, 2016 @11:04AM (#10902170)
I believe "kerberosauthentication" and "rhostsauthentication" are documented as well. I'd check the "official" OpenBSD man page instead of whatever you have on your system. Regardless, thanks.
Re:OpenSSH: client bug CVE-2016-0777 by agwa on Thursday January 14, 2016 @11:08AM (#10902196)
In the latest OpenSSH-portable source, those are considered "unsupported" and "deprecated," respectively (which means they're ignored, essentially). See https://gist.github.com/AGWA/e92d4f5343be1f7a941d#file-undoc... as well as the source https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/blob/e6c85f8889c...
Re:OpenSSH: client bug CVE-2016-0777 by ryanlol on Thursday January 14, 2016 @11:07AM (#10902190)
Neither of those are mentioned on the latest manpage from git.
Re:OpenSSH: client bug CVE-2016-0777 by noja on Thursday January 14, 2016 @10:26AM (#10901913)
Please report back what you find!
Re:OpenSSH: client bug CVE-2016-0777 by drzaiusapelord on Thursday January 14, 2016 @10:55AM (#10902111)
It just sounds like a big code-base fuckup. They more or less admit it: "Server side was disabled/gutted for years already, but this aspect was surprisingly forgotten."

Sounds like this was put in at one time, forgotten about, and the code lingered for a long time until someone pointed it out. SSH as a protocol is pretty crazy. Everyone loves it, but its a lot of things in one, which ironically goes against the unix philosophy. Its a remote terminal, a file transfer server, a network tunnel server, a socks server, etc. There's a lot of stuff in there and I imagine difficult to work with sometimes.

No word if this is enabled in Putty, but I imagine it is if its using openssh libraries.

Re:OpenSSH: client bug CVE-2016-0777 by alanpost on Thursday January 14, 2016 @11:05AM (#10902180)
Given that this exploit happens during capability negotiation (or whatever SSH calls that part of the protocol), it also cannot be mitigated via pledge[2], which is where OpenBSD has been focusing a lot of attention. This is an unusual stumble for the OpenBSD team. Client-side privsep support, if such a thing existed, might mitigate attacks like this. As it stands protecting against exploits of this type wasn't even on the hardening roadmap.

http://www.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/man.cgi/OpenBSD-current/man2/...

Re:OpenSSH: client bug CVE-2016-0777 by icebraining on Thursday January 14, 2016 @12:08PM (#10902659)
Related: "Protecting sshd using spiped" by cperciva

http://www.daemonology.net/blog/2012-08-30-protecting-sshd-u...

Re:OpenSSH: client bug CVE-2016-0777 by _yy on Thursday January 14, 2016 @12:01PM (#10902612)
SCP/SFTP is actually a separate binary.

PuTTY is definitely not affected since it has its own SSH implementation.

Re:OpenSSH: client bug CVE-2016-0777 by mkj on Thursday January 14, 2016 @11:41AM (#10902443)
PuTTY is completely different code.
Re:OpenSSH: client bug CVE-2016-0777 by jlgaddis on Thursday January 14, 2016 @11:04AM (#10902173)
Pretty sure this is OpenSSH only. PuTTY and SecureCRT, at least, are reported not to be affected.
Re:OpenSSH: client bug CVE-2016-0777 by larrymcp on Thursday January 14, 2016 @03:09PM (#10904058)
We use WinSCP also, a file copying utility; it would be useful to know whether that's affected if anybody has that info.
Re:OpenSSH: client bug CVE-2016-0777 by voltagex_ on Friday January 15, 2016 @12:24AM (#10907389)
Last time I looked WinSCP used PuTTY components or a fork. Would appreciate additional verification of this, though.
Re:OpenSSH: client bug CVE-2016-0777 by jlgaddis on Thursday January 14, 2016 @11:00AM (#10902141)
Server-side you can see the "full config" sshd uses:

  $ /usr/sbin/sshd -T -f /etc/ssh/sshd_config
Modify, if necessary, to point to the location of your `sshd` and configuration file.
Re:OpenSSH: client bug CVE-2016-0777 by JimmaDaRustla on Thursday January 14, 2016 @11:34AM (#10902383)
I came here to ask exactly this, and also why this feature isn't documented. Sounds like a nice little exploit.