"Financial Crimes, covering missions such as prevention and investigation of counterfeit U.S. currency, U.S. treasury securities, and investigation of major fraud."
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Secret_Service
It is almost always better/cheaper to prevent a crime from happening by removing the opportunity. Without bringing in spreadsheets and US federal budget reports, having the CC industry deploy a technological solution is cheaper than investigating, trying, arresting and housing these criminals. Gas pumps are expensive units, require regular service, and each move thousands of dollars worth of gas every day. A few bucks for the chip reader is no great burden.
It's a risk-cost tradeoff. Many people desperate enough to work in these areas are happy they actually got even a shit job and don't intentionally defraud their employer (and losses due to customer theft are priced in, anyways). The bet is on those who are crazy/desperate enough to actually exploit the weaknesses in the system to commit bigger fraud - and how much damage is to be expected.
Now, take the expected damage and contrast it with paying your employees more, and I bet that it's cheaper risking one or two 10K thefts a year than paying all employees more which can be, even if you're only running a 10-employee shop and raise salaries by 2-3K/yr, the cheaper option.
Well, in the end customers are paying with the (exorbitantly high) CC fees. It's all priced in.
Although, I'm not sure what's worse, the penalties or the interest if you don't fully pay your balance every month.
I'm confused: Are you talking about chips in the pumps - or the cards? The article seems to show a deep integration into the pumps to steal not only the magstripe data, but also the PIN. So I guess they already target chip & pin systems?
Plus, depending on the architecture of these systems you can 'degrade' a transaction from 'needs pin' to 'pin not required' (we had a couple of related downgrade articles here on HN and the 32C3 had - specific to Germany, but acc. to the authors probably somewhat applicable elsewhere - a talk about direct attacks against payment terminals to do the same thing).
If they did, the headlines would suddenly be "Credit card companies forcing mom and pop shops to spend thousands on new equipment"
---- On Oct. 1, 2015, Visa and MasterCard put in force new rules that can penalize merchants who do not yet have chip-enabled terminals. Under the new rules, merchants that don’t have the technology to accept chip cards will assume full liability for the cost of fraud from purchases in which the customer presented a chip-enabled card.
But those rules don’t apply to fuel stations in the United States until October 2017, and a great many stations won’t meet that deadline, said Verifone’s Turner. ----
According to "Yearbook 2005: British Retail Consortium" [1], by the time of the liability shift (1 January 2005) "retailers accounting for 75% of transactions" had a chip+PIN terminal, with the remainder "well on the way". It goes on to explain that small businesses including petrol stations were consulted as the change was planned, there was no relaxed deadline for them. (If my memory is correct, petrol station pumps were among the first to switch, as they had the highest level of fraud — relatively high-value transactions with no supervision.)
[1] https://books.google.dk/books?id=csUYwwVZ2AUC&pg=PT207&dq=ch...
This should be handled by the CC industry. US pumps should have chips like they do in most every other developed nation. It's an arms race, but prevention is easier than investigation.
And do not blame "the attendants". I worked as a light mechanic at one of the last truly full service stations. The pump/retail guys are payed minimum wage on flexible shifts to do a job that is actually rather dangerous. Only one of possibly a hundred attendants may know anything about the skimmer install. The guys who own/run the stations should also not be above suspicion. My bosses were some rather shady characters.