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Re:NSA Helped British Spies Find Security Holes in Juniper F... by tptacek on Wednesday December 23, 2015 @01:46PM (#10784864)
Worth considering: every serious SIGINT agency probably had this capability against Netscreen VPNs. If you do a lot of network infiltration, these boxes are among the most useful targets; unlike routers running JunOS, the VPN concentrators have a large outside-the-packet-filter attack surface, and everyone runs them.

It'd be surprising if NSA and GCHQ didn't have similarly powerful capabilities against all the current VPN products.

Re:NSA Helped British Spies Find Security Holes in Juniper F... by adrtessier on Wednesday December 23, 2015 @04:00PM (#10785618)
> If you do a lot of network infiltration, these boxes are among the most useful targets; unlike routers running JunOS, the VPN concentrators have a large outside-the-packet-filter attack surface, and everyone runs them.

Don't forget that the newer SRX-series VPN gateways are JunOS-based, and seem to be recommended by most Juniper sales people these days. There are certainly a ton of ScreenOS devices, but Juniper seems to have mostly deprecated them in their messaging.

The primary Juniper security track certifications are JunOS-focused, and there's only a basic specialization available from them for ScreenOS. Juniper has mostly staked their future on JunOS from what I can tell.

Re:NSA Helped British Spies Find Security Holes in Juniper F... by epistasis on Wednesday December 23, 2015 @02:37PM (#10785154)
While I don't doubt that's true for closed-source products, would it also be true for open source products? I've heard that some methods of IPSec key exchange are compromised, but don't know details. Would it also be good to suspect OpenVPN's method of key exchange?
Re:NSA Helped British Spies Find Security Holes in Juniper F... by jcrawfordor on Wednesday December 23, 2015 @02:53PM (#10785235)
The vast majority of defects groups like intelligence agencies are exploiting are not going to be intentionally-placed backdoors - they're going to be typical vulnerabilities discovered the normal way, just by an organization with immense resources and no motivation to share.

So the bottom-line is that it comes down to how much you trust the people that made the software. Is it a very high quality vendor? Is it a very high quality open-source project?

The nice thing about open-source software is that you have a much better ability to evaluate this from the inside. Get on mailing lists, poke around trackers, and see how they usually deal with security disclosures. Do they even have a formal program to do so? I'm not sure that OpenVPN does, although a lot of distros watch that carefully.

Re:NSA Helped British Spies Find Security Holes in Juniper F... by armitron on Thursday December 24, 2015 @05:24PM (#10789753)
I'm sorry but this all comes to moot. For any opensource project of substantial size, you absolutely "have not a much better ability to evaluate this from the inside by getting on mailing list and trackers". All of that is irrelevant and a waste of time at best (at worst you're deluding yourself).

Unless you're one of the few people on the planet who are good at auditing code for security vulnerabilities and devote the time to do it (or pay someone else to do the same), you have no stable basis to be making any assumptions as to the security status of a codebase.

If this doesn't convince you, look at all the security-critical opensource projects that are riddled with security bugs. There is not a single one of them that hasn't been compromised time and time again.

Sad but true.

Re:NSA Helped British Spies Find Security Holes in Juniper F... by superuser2 on Wednesday December 23, 2015 @04:17PM (#10785710)
Take a look at the CVEs. People find vulnerabilities in trusted open source projects all the time. The NSA hires a lot of smart people to spend all day looking for them and not share their findings with the Internet.

No infiltration required.

Re:NSA Helped British Spies Find Security Holes in Juniper F... by sitkack on Wednesday December 23, 2015 @08:16PM (#10786553)
Kinda makes CERT a backwater. By the time it is public, you are already owned.
Re:NSA Helped British Spies Find Security Holes in Juniper F... by vox_mollis on Wednesday December 23, 2015 @02:53PM (#10785240)
Since it's now clear that "many eyes makes all bugs shallow" is patently false, the MO for said agencies to compromise OSS projects is to play the long game of making numerous benign commits, becoming trusted, then committing subtly compromised code.

This would be much easier than compromising specific algorithms or KE protocols. Cheap, too. All it takes is plenty of patience.

Re:NSA Helped British Spies Find Security Holes in Juniper F... by nickpsecurity on Wednesday December 23, 2015 @03:24PM (#10785437)
The threat is long proven and it's wise you consider it. The high assurance sector & CompSci demonstrated it repeatedly in pentests and evaluations going back to the 70's. Here's some stuff for you or anyone interested in the subversion threat.

Landmark work by Myer in 1980 fleshing it out http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/history/myer80.pdf

Demonstration of simplicity of it against NFS by Anderson http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a401762.pdf

Lack's use of one against Windows XP https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/962/03Jun_Lac...

All the same group, Navy Postgraduate School, with some of the professors being founders of information security field. They never forget the old stuff that works. Always mention the old strategy, high-assurance, as a solution as it was only thing proven to work. People never learn, though. Hence, endless opportunities in new projects for 0-days and subversion. ;)

Re:NSA Helped British Spies Find Security Holes in Juniper F... by alephnil on Wednesday December 23, 2015 @05:15PM (#10786001)
The "many eyes makes all bugs shallow" quote was never said in the context of security vulnerabilities, and I would argue that they are different in nature. Normally, a bug means that something that I want to work doesn't. Then I can fix it or report it.

When the bug is a security vulnerability (e.g. Hertbleed), then everything work as it should, I can log into all the servers I have access to and all the functionality I want is there. The difference is that someone else can get access to my system or get access to information they are not supposed to. You don't discover this by using the system, you have to actively be looking for vulnerabilities. This is quite different from other kinds of bugs.

Re:NSA Helped British Spies Find Security Holes in Juniper F... by krapp on Wednesday December 23, 2015 @03:28PM (#10785460)
To be fair, it's probably not "many eyes make all bugs shallow" which is necessarily false, but the implication that open source guarantees enough eyes to begin with.

Whether or not an open source project is popular, whether contributing looks good on a resume, the number of competent programmers in the relevant fields with time to spare, and even the aesthetic quality of the code probably have influence on how much attention it gets. A hip framework is bound to get much more attention than an old, horrifying to look at mess of C, even if the latter happens to be mission critical to the internet.

All bugs might be shallow, if the number of eyes scaled in proportion with the amount of code, and the number of languages remained constant. The problem might be that people simply assumed Linus' law to be axiomatic, which results in kind of a Someone Else's Problem field permeating the community, as well as an implicit trust in the security of FOSS code which might not necessarily be warranted.

Re:NSA Helped British Spies Find Security Holes in Juniper F... by nyan4 on Wednesday December 23, 2015 @02:59PM (#10785275)
> Since it's now clear that "many eyes makes all bugs shallow" is patently false

"patently false". Proof needed, please, we have enough FUD.

Re:NSA Helped British Spies Find Security Holes in Juniper F... by nickpsecurity on Wednesday December 23, 2015 @03:16PM (#10785393)
On contrary, the person making that claim needs to prove it's true or else we reject it as FUD against proprietary software. For a long time, the only software to resist prolonged pentesting by NSA were proprietary products certified to B3/A1 and Type 1 respectively. If NSA could hack them, they couldn't pass. Likewise, in safety, we've seen a number of high assurance systems fielded where every state (including failure) it could be in was known ahead of time. Some setups, like mainframes, hit 17-30 year uptime. All proprietary.

Meanwhile, in OSS land, we have a steady stream of easily-prevented or detected defects that compromise security. Just like in most proprietary shops. Like proprietary, those OSS projects producing highly-secure stuff are done by great designers/coders with careful review and testing processes. The community-developed OSS hasn't reached the assurance of aforementioned proprietary systems or some in academia. Yet, highly correct or secure stuff seems equally rare in both types of development with proprietary having a bit more just because there were people paying professionals to build those. In theory, with free/cheap labor, OSS could eventually produce more but there's not enough interest.

So, the endless stream of bugs in both closed and OSS software that are often really old disproves many eyes argument. It didn't work for even shallowest bugs consistently, much less deep ones. Software quality comes from people taking responsibility and putting time into QA, esp design/code review. OSS, shared-source proprietary, closed-source... always same requirement that gives quality.

Re:NSA Helped British Spies Find Security Holes in Juniper F... by guelo on Wednesday December 23, 2015 @08:18PM (#10786559)
Maybe a new OSS license is needed where the price of using the software is reviewing some code once in a while.
Re:NSA Helped British Spies Find Security Holes in Juniper F... by nickpsecurity on Wednesday December 23, 2015 @11:43PM (#10787151)
I broke it down from a security or auditing angle for all sides here:

https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2014/05/friday_squid_...

Review was fundamental. It would be costly and take talent. So, like you, I proposed something that was open source but not quite free. Not many in OSS want to discuss proprietary OSS options but I think it's a critical conversation as it could get better stuff on the market. Prior conversations here at least showed the term, open source, was highly loaded with the expectation of free distribution due to its history. So, I'll modify the essay and next discussion to use shared source.

Elaborated more on my concept for a hybrid here:

https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=10500298

Re:NSA Helped British Spies Find Security Holes in Juniper F... by vox_mollis on Wednesday December 23, 2015 @03:06PM (#10785327)
GnuTLS and Heartbleed are pretty good examples for starters.
Re:NSA Helped British Spies Find Security Holes in Juniper F... by MikeNomad on Wednesday December 23, 2015 @03:29PM (#10785464)
And for counter examples, I refer to the CERT emails I get regarding the latest software vulnerabilities and patches.

Software security is unfortunately, a goal, not an absolute. The process is both fluid and dynamic, and the improvements iterative.

To directly address the tenor of your comments, perhaps it would be better to say, "More eyes make bugs more shallow."

Re:NSA Helped British Spies Find Security Holes in Juniper F... by wiml on Wednesday December 23, 2015 @05:37PM (#10786089)
> the MO for said agencies to compromise OSS projects is to play the long game of making numerous benign commits

Are there examples of this actually happening— that is, a nominally trusted committer intentionally adding a backdoor to a widely used OSS project? If this is in fact "the MO for said agencies", then there should be several examples you can point to.