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Re:Juniper screenOS authentication backdoor - master ssh pas... by revelation on Sunday December 20, 2015 @08:15PM (#10769040)
So, did they have time for a git blame yet? It's one thing to say you have found a backdoor, another is to clear up how it got there in the first place.
Re:Juniper screenOS authentication backdoor - master ssh pas... by StringyBob on Sunday December 20, 2015 @08:55PM (#10769149)
If you are capable of inserting this kind of backdoor, how easy is it to compromise a version control system? (or the login details of one of the programmers?).

Is it possible to prevent history of the code being modified? Do DVCS use blockchains?

Re:Juniper screenOS authentication backdoor - master ssh pas... by hueving on Sunday December 20, 2015 @09:03PM (#10769176)
If a git commit is modified, every commit hash after it will change and will break every clone.
Re:Juniper screenOS authentication backdoor - master ssh pas... by escape_goat on Monday December 21, 2015 @12:59AM (#10769815)
That's a system that would still be entirely vulnerable to collision attacks, though, right?
Re:Juniper screenOS authentication backdoor - master ssh pas... by vishbar on Monday December 21, 2015 @07:38AM (#10770798)
I'd imagine it would be nearly impossible to generate a collision that a.) does what you want, b.) is small enough to be unobtrusive, and c.) can be discovered in finite time with the computing power reasonably available to NSA/GCHQ/insert SIGINT organization of choice.
Re:Juniper screenOS authentication backdoor - master ssh pas... by escape_goat on Monday December 21, 2015 @07:21PM (#10774660)
I asked because git uses SHA1, which might be a bit low on (c) at this point.
Re:Juniper screenOS authentication backdoor - master ssh pas... by vishbar on Tuesday December 22, 2015 @06:32AM (#10777109)
True. Generating collisions is doable, but a.) and b.) are still huge constraints that make it orders of magnitude more difficult.
Re:Juniper screenOS authentication backdoor - master ssh pas... by wosos on Sunday December 20, 2015 @10:30PM (#10769415)
True, it could've been easier to use fake credentials from the start
Re:Juniper screenOS authentication backdoor - master ssh pas... by stordoff on Sunday December 20, 2015 @10:49PM (#10769479)
git blame will only really help if the backdoor was inserted into the original code (and even then stolen credentials are possible) AFAIK. It's fairly easy to imagine a scenario where this is not the case:

* Compromised build script - probably under source control as well? * Compromised compiler - If the attackers had this level of access, they probably had enough access to erase logs showing who/when the compiler was replaced * Binary patch the compiler output - Not impossible (though I suspect unlikely?) that the original source and build system are clean, but the binary is tampered with after the fact.

Re:Juniper screenOS authentication backdoor - master ssh pas... by w_t_payne on Monday December 21, 2015 @07:24AM (#10770746)
So ... my plan is to put the tuple (hash(source), hash(bin)) into the blockchain as a part of each build ... could this work?