When John Locke argued for the moral right of property as a result of labor, he also argued that it only applies when there are an abundance of resources. An extension of that though could be, why not look at all rent generating propert with suspicion. Property rents, as a result of exclusive rights to scarce resources, could be seen as an externality, as a result of everybody else accepting those exclusive rights without compensation for being excluded.
Insofar as current arrangements of a state holding eminent domain, yes. Not intrinsically.
Property rents, as a result of exclusive rights to scarce resources, could be seen as an externality, as a result of everybody else accepting those exclusive rights without compensation for being excluded.
A property owner may extend easement or some other non-possessory right to usage, so to immediately classify all property as an "externality" is flat out wrong. If anything, private property rights are a necessary (if not the primary) precondition to resolving externalities.
Without the state taking the cost of enforcing the exclusivity the possessor would probably have to invest some cost in securing it. Either buying weapons or entering some kind of contractual agreements.
In either case the cost would probably correlate with the value of property. The rent, then, is the value the possessor can extract from the property as a result of not having to take those costs. In fact, it is the other way around, the cost is distributed among the non-possessors.
Assuming we would like to avoid a situation where possessors have to invest in violent means of exclusivity, I argue that the states role should be to enforce propery as, fair, contractual agreements between possessor and non-possessors.
But the nature of uncertainty of action means that such a cost isn't really quantifiable. It seems like you're trying to say that the rent is the value derived during idling. But idling can serve a valid social purpose in conferring availability of something, or when land is converted for a purpose only on occasion but must necessarily remain available by idling.
A possibly fairer way might be to let you pay what the next highest bidder is prepared to pay. That means you unique addition remains your profit, while also quantifying the opportunity cost instead.
Regarding idling, I'm not arguing against that, only against the system by how it's scheduled and who pays and who gets paid for it
No, property rights are intrinsically a creation of government through law, whether or not the government reserves something like the power of eminent domain.
If you take someone's home, they are homeless. If you copy someone's cat video, they still have their copy to enjoy. That's a huge distinction.
Information, because it isn't matter, can be copied very easily. It's actually quite tricky to make sure that only one person has a piece of information. This is why bitcoin and block chains are technically interesting.
All of this impacts the consequences and morality of the two kinds of "stealing". Stealing matter necessarily harms someone. They just lost something. Even if things can be easily replaced, the identity of matter is important. I could go out and buy another birthday card just like the one on my desk, but I'll never be able to truly replace it because my grandpa gave it to me just before he died. On the other hand, the identity of an instance of data generally isn't important. If I lose a video of my grandpa and then acquire a different copy, it isn't that important.
Copyrights and patents are state-granted exclusionary privileges, not property titles.
If you want to improve wealth distribution, messing with the mechanics of how things are bought and sold, as always, isn't going to get you very far.
What are you talking about? Abolishing and reforming institutions is one of the most powerful tools there is.
Maybe just raise taxes, you know?
The whole point of this paper is that simplistic fiscal shenanigans like this don't work.