Also for SSDs, using the secure erase method is important because of overprovisioning and garbage collection. If that is not available, on most SSD algorithms, doing two full pass writes (with random sector data if drive supported compression) will get you close to wiping out all contents as possible.
https://github.com/Drive-Trust-Alliance/sedutil/blob/master/...
# openssl enc -aes-256-ctr -pass pass:"$(dd if=/dev/urandom bs=128 count=1 2>/dev/null | base64)" -nosalt </dev/zero \ | pv -bartpes <DISK_SIZE> | dd bs=64K of=/dev/sd"X"
To randomize the drive/partition using a randomly-seeded AES cipher from OpenSSL (displaying the optional progress meter with pv): https://wiki.archlinux.org/index.php/Securely_wipe_disk/Tips...
Then I take out the drill press and make a bunch of holes.
I believe there is a long standing bounty for anyone who can retrieve useful data from a drive that had been zero'd once. No one has been able to thus far.
A lot of the disk wiping "culture" stems from a much earlier time when disk technology was less reliable, especially in regards to writes. Dan Gutmann himself says that the Gutmann method is long antiquated and only worked with MFM/RLL encoded disks from the 80s and early 90s.
Perhaps instead of humoring these people, we should be educating them. A zero'd out disk is a wiped disk until someone proves otherwise.
Extra caution would be shredding the drive or some other non-wipe method. At work for example, we zero out drives and then those drives get physically destroyed by a vendor.
This gets misunderstood as "you need to do 35 passes of these patterns". You don't, Gutmann recommends a couple of overwrites of random data, and a single overwrite of zeros is probably enough.
Not so much that the drive manufacturers are engaging in malfeasance (though that's certainly not off the table), but that it's not unheard of for certain agencies in certain governments to crock low level system components (intercepting them in shipping and so forth) so they work against the user.
..or just plain ignorance. A study indicates that back in 2011, half of the major drive vendors weren't doing the erase correctly. https://www.usenix.org/legacy/events/fast11/tech/full_papers...
But yeah, you're right. If you ever have reason to invoke the secure erase command, you're probably in a position where the next step is throwing the drive in a shredder.
You only need one.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Data_erasure#Number_of_overwri...
He's right that a single overwrite of zero is probably good enough to make sure that data is gone, but it's probably not enough to persuade other people that it's gone. A few passes of pseudo random data is probably better if you need to persuade other people that the data has gone.
But if it's really important drive wiping is what you do to protect the drives until you get a change to grind them.