Re:United Airlines Bug Bounty: An experience in reporting a ...
by buro9 on Monday November 23, 2015 @06:08AM
(#10613928)
Actually, case in point... X-Forwarded-For. This is not in a spec, people are using it as an unofficial standard. But so long as your edge removes it and then sets it... you're good.
Except Google are doing their page speed optimisation thing in the style of the Opera Mini proxy, but for Chrome users on Android. Google have chosen to populate X-Forwarded-For, so any website that wants to audit the IP address of an end user now has to read this untrusted header.
So devs will realise this, look at the header, stop stripping it at the edge, and start trusting what is essentially a string that anyone can set.
Re:United Airlines Bug Bounty: An experience in reporting a ...
by xena on Monday November 23, 2015 @11:21AM
(#10615408)
I like the way IRC networks handle this, they use a pre-connection protocol verb called WEBIRC (de-facto standard documented here: http://git.io/vBLYp) that also enforces a whitelist of ip address + password combination. This stops most abuse of this feature. Maybe HTTP servers should have something similar.
Literally, every single piece of information that an application receives is not to be trusted. Even if it's something you think you have set and have full control of (a cookie value), you're wrong... you have no control, and attackers can and will manipulate every field or property to gain a foothold.